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Dividend payments to shareholders can create conflicts between debt and equity 
investors as these payments can expropriate wealth from bondholders to shareholders. 
However, dividend payments can also serve as a signal regarding firms’ future earnings. 
Utilizing both improved bond event study techniques as well as a conditional event study 
model to control for self-selection and the presence of confounding earnings 
announcements, I find that, on net, dividend increases represent a transfer of wealth from 
debtholders to shareholders. Nevertheless, bondholders react more favorably to larger 
dividend changes consistent with the presence of a positive signaling effect. The 
conditional event study approach also provides the ability to test whether managerial 
hesitancy in cutting dividends may represent an additional source of expropriation. My 
results indicate that while bondholders are clearly harmed by these implicit dividend 
increases, evidence in support of shareholders’ gains is mixed. 
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Bonds and equity possess option-like payoffs such that shareholders generally wish to
increase the risk of the firm whereas bondholders prefer to minimize downside risk (Mer-
ton, 1974). Given the differing nature of these securities, debtholders and shareholders
can come into conflict with one another regarding the optimal management of a leveraged
firm. Commonly mentioned examples of this behavior include the asset substitution prob-
lem raised by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the debt overhang issue explored by Myers
(1977). A third example, and the focus of this study, is the transfer of wealth from bond-
holders to shareholders through dividend payments.
Dividends can potentially transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders by increas-
ing the default risk of the outstanding debt (Galai and Masulis, 1976). As noted by Lease,
John, Kalay, Loewenstein, and Sarig (2000), by paying dividends, stockholders appropri-
ate assets (i.e. cash) shared by all securityholders to their exclusive control. This harms
debtholders as it not only increases the likelihood of default, but also lowers the amount
of assets that can be used for repayment should forfeiture occur. As bondholders are not
compensated for the increased riskiness of their claims, they lose wealth when dividends
are paid, while shareholders ultimately gain.
However, it is not necessarily the case that dividend payments should be interpreted
negatively by bondholders. The information content of dividends hypothesis (e.g. Bhat-
tacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985) posits that, in the pres-
ence of asymmetric information, managers can use dividend increases as a credible mecha-
nism to communicate to external investors that earnings will be higher in the future. There-
fore, a positive change in dividends paid may indicate an increase in the likelihood of
repayment. While the empirical evidence in favor of the information content of dividends
hypothesis has been mixed (see Kalay and Lemmon, 2007, for an overview), recent work
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by Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006),
and Denis and Osobov (2008) has found support for the life-cycle hypothesis of dividends.
The life-cycle hypothesis suggests that as companies mature, their ability to generate stable
cash flows outpaces the number of profitable investment opportunities available to them.
Consequently, they disburse their free cash flows as dividends. Thus, regardless of whether
dividend increases signal the rise of earnings growth or stability of firms’ future permanent
income, dividend announcements have the potential to be positive news for bondholders.
To date, previous work has reached differing conclusions on how bondholders view
dividend announcements. For example, Woolridge (1983) and Handjinicolaou and Kalay
(1984) execute event studies and find that bondholders experience positive, albeit statis-
tically insignificant, abnormal returns from the announcement of dividend increases, but
respond in a negative and statistically significant fashion to dividend decreases. As these
studies find that abnormal bond returns move in the same direction as abnormal stock re-
turns, their results are consistent with the signaling hypothesis. However, in line with the
wealth transfer hypothesis and contrary to theoretical models which suggest that larger div-
idend changes should send more credible signals to market participants, Dhillon and John-
son (1994) find that the bond market reacts negatively to dividend initiations and increases
greater than 30% in magnitude and positively to dividend omissions and decreases.
Aside from the ambiguity surrounding the conclusions reached in prior studies, the abil-
ity to generalize the results from the extant literature is further complicated by two factors.
First, a number of substantial changes have taken place in both payout policy and corporate
governance since the 1970’s, the sample period examined by previous work. As bondhold-
ers’ responses to dividend announcements are likely to depend on these conditions, a rein-
vestigation of how debtholders respond to these events seems warranted. This is especially
pressing given that many of these changes may adversely affect bondholders. For instance,
Fama and French (2001) find that while there are now fewer firms paying dividends, the
real amount of aggregate dividends has steadily increased over time. Moreover, as noted
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by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004), dividend payment has become increasingly
concentrated in large, mature industrial firms where asymmetric information should not be
a pressing concern. From the perspective of bondholders, these developments may prove
worrisome as they indicate that while the need to use dividends as a signaling device has
lessened, firms are nevertheless paying out dividends at higher levels. Moreover, Skinner
(2008) shows that share repurchases have recently become the predominant method of cor-
porate payout, with only a few firms now paying dividends exclusively. Thus, given that
shareholders are already distributing cash to themselves in the form of share repurchases
and repurchases offer distinct advantages relative to dividends (e.g. greater flexibility, tax
treatment), the announcement of a dividend increase may be viewed by debtholders as
simply an additional wealth grab by equityholders.
Signaling is not the only motivation that the payout literature has proposed for issuing
dividends. Indeed, a large literature has emerged which suggests that dividend payments
are an effective means of reducing the agency problems associated with free cash flow (e.g.
Easterbrook, 1984). However, it is not immediately obvious that corporate governance
mechanisms that have developed to protect shareholders’ interests necessarily safeguard
bondholders. For example, recent work (e.g. Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005; Chava,
Kumar, and Warga, 2010) has shown that debtholders prefer firms with higher levels of
managerial entrenchment, as it insulates them from costly anti-takeover measures1 and re-
sults in the use of less leverage (Garvey and Hanka, 1999). Directly related to dividend
policy, Francis, Hasan, John, and Song (2011) use the changes in state-level anti-takeover
laws as a quasi-natural experiment to show that increases to managerial entrenchment led
to lower dividend payout levels. This suggests that another reason bondholders may favor
entrenched management is their lower propensity to pay out.2 Consequently, the general
1See Dann and DeAngelo (1988), Denis (1990), Heron and Lie (2006) and Billett and Xue (2007) for
evidence of payouts as a takeover defense mechanism. Also, see Warga and Welch (1993) and Billett, King,
and Mauer (2004) for evidence of bondholder losses following successful takeover bids.
2It is worth noting that Hu and Kumar (2004) find that more entrenched managers are more likely to pay
out and have higher payout levels. The authors attribute this to entrenched managers preempting any type
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decrease in managerial entrenchment over time may alter how bondholders perceive divi-
dend payments.
Other areas of corporate governance have also undergone substantial changes over
time, such as the increased presence of institutional investors and modifications to how
managerial compensation is awarded. As Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) note,
in 1970 institutions only owned 10% of publicly-traded equity, but by 2006, they owned
nearly 60%. Since recent work has shown that concentrated institutional ownership can
adversely affect bondholders (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003) and can shape payout policy
(Desai and Jin, 2011; Crane, Michenaud, and Weston, 2012; Gaspar, Massa, Matos, Pat-
giri, and Rehman, 2013), exploring how their increased presence has affected debtholders
through dividend policy seems worthwhile. Likewise, executive compensation may affect
how debtholders view dividend payments. Relative to the 1970’s, there has been sizable
growth in the use of equity-based compensation over time (Frydman and Saks, 2010). The
impetus behind this shift is that equity-based compensation is thought to better align man-
agers’ and shareholders’ interests. However, doing so comes with the potential problem of
exacerbating the agency costs of debt (John and John, 1993).3 As executive compensation
packages are multifaceted, it is not easy to succinctly state how these changes may affect
bondholders’ perceptions of dividend payments. Even so, given its potential to change
managers’ incentives, an investigation seems prudent.
The second reason that it is difficult to extrapolate the results of previous studies to
bondholders today is that prior work was based on small, hand-collected samples of bond
prices from the mid-1970’s. Additionally, as noted by Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and
Xu (2009), these studies often focused on a “representative bond” method where only one
of disciplinary takeover. However, Hu and Kumar do not attempt to control for the possible endogeneity
between the dividend payout decision and the level of entrenchment.
3Consistent with this idea, Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) note that credit rating agencies often
consider executive compensation in making their credit assessments as it directly affects managers incentives
in setting firm policy, while Kuang and Qin (2013) actually show that increases in equity-based compensation
lead to credit rating downgrades. Finally, Billett, Mauer, and Zhang (2010) show that announcements of
equity-based compensation tend to be good news for shareholders and negative news for bondholders.
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bond per firm was selected for analysis. This approach was obviously understandable given
the difficulty in obtaining reliable daily bond prices at the time. Nonetheless, it clearly has
the potential to misrepresent the true wealth effect generated from a dividend announce-
ments since companies, such as the large, mature types of firms that populate the universe
of dividend payers, often have multiple debt issues outstanding. However, the recent avail-
ability of transaction-level bond price data through the Trade Reporting and Compliance
Engine (TRACE) coupled with the newly developed bond event study methodology spear-
headed by Bessembinder et al. (2009) should provide a more comprehensive assessment of
the wealth effects caused by dividend announcements.
Given the aforementioned issues, the goal of this study is to reassess how dividend an-
nouncements affect bondholders’ wealth using data from the TRACE database from 2002
to 2012. In order to accomplish this task, I will first focus on performing an event study
to establish whether the wealth transfer or signaling effect dominates on net. While this
approach is how previous studies have typically proceeded, it does not provide a complete
picture of the potential wealth effects caused by dividend announcements. For example,
categorizing abnormal returns into bins based on dividend announcement type ignores the
cross-sectional variation in the abnormal returns due to factors such as the magnitude of the
announced dividend change. This point is particularly germane as previous authors have
noted that the wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; it is
possible for both effects to simultaneously exist. Thus, finding that abnormal bond returns
earned at dividend increases are negative on average does not preclude the possibility that
dividends do not also serve a signaling function and vice versa. Therefore, it seems rea-
sonable to conduct a regression-based analysis to further examine any conclusions reached
from the event study results.
The use of a regression-based analysis is also beneficial in the context of the cur-
rent study as there are two pertinent issues that traditional event study techniques are ill-
equipped to handle. The first concern is that the decision of the firm’s management to
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modify its dividend payout is not a random outcome; rather, it is one that managers pur-
posefully self-select.4 For example, the results of Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely
(2005) indicate that over two-thirds of the Chief Financial Officers surveyed indicated that
a careful consideration of the permanence of future earnings was critical in making a div-
idend payout decision. The self-selection issue has direct consequences for the abnormal
returns earned by securityholders at dividend announcements. If the event is largely antic-
ipated by securityholders, the announcement period abnormal returns will be muted since
the value-relevant information from the event will have largely been priced into the secu-
rity. However, if the actual announcement differs from the market’s expectation, then larger
abnormal returns will be experienced. Thus, predicting the market’s expectations regard-
ing the likelihood of a dividend change based on observables related to the firm’s financial
condition, governance mechanisms, and financial contracting (i.e. the presence of restric-
tive dividend covenants) environment is crucial in properly understanding how dividend
announcements affect the wealth of bondholders and shareholders.
Secondly, as has been recognized since at least Aharony and Swary (1980), dividend
news is often released near quarterly earnings announcements. As prior research (e.g. Eas-
ton, Monahan, and Vasvari, 2009) has shown that the corporate debt market responds to
earnings announcements, the presence of these secondary announcements raises the con-
cern about confounding information invalidating the event study results. While the cus-
tomary advice would be to drop the dividend announcements with corresponding earnings
announcements nearby, this is problematic for two reasons. First, as dividends and current
earnings are thought to provide a signal regarding the firm’s future earnings, the fact that
managers choose to pair both types of information does not seem coincidental. Previous
work has demonstrated that dividend and earnings announcements have a corroborative re-
lationship. For example, both Ofer and Siegel (1987) and Ely and Mande (1996) find that
analysts use information from dividend announcements to update their predictions of fu-
4See Li and Prabhala (2007) for recent overview of self-selection models in corporate finance.
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ture earnings while Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984) find direct evidence of a joint signaling
effect in abnormal stock returns and Datta and Dhillon (1993) find a similar effect in the
bond market. These results, coupled with the fact that managers often strategically time
both earnings (e.g. Penman, 1984) and dividend announcements (Kalay and Loewenstein,
1986), suggests that the joint announcement decision should be controlled for rather than
ignored. Second, as noted by Nayak and Prabhala (2001), the elimination of confounding
observations may not eliminate bias from the sample. Specifically, if the market expects
a joint announcement to occur, then its absence (i.e. a “non-event”) may cause a price
reaction. Thus, the seemingly “clean” sample may contain multiple instances of these non-
events and be biased itself. This point is particularly relevant given that Venkatesh and
Chiang (1986) find an increase in asymmetric information following the absence of an an-
ticipated joint dividend and earnings announcement suggesting that investors respond to
so-called non-events.
The use of a self-selection model also allows me to explore a form of wealth trans-
fer that has been suggested in the literature, but never explicitly tested. Specifically, as
discussed by Allen and Michaely (2003), the idea that managers will attempt to system-
atically expropriate bondholders by paying shareholders excessively high dividends seems
somewhat implausible given reputational costs and the possibility of having to return to the
corporate debt market sometime in the future (e.g. John and Nachman, 1985). However,
Allen and Michaely suggest that a form of passive expropriation may be possible.
Given the well-documented reluctance of managers to cut dividend payments, man-
agerial inaction in cutting an unsustainable dividend may create a transfer of wealth from
bondholders to shareholders. If capital market participants are anticipating that a firm will
cut its dividend, the failure to do so will result in an implicit dividend increase. Hence, it is
a non-event that the market reacts to rather than an explicit action on the part of managers.
Both survey (Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005) and empirical (Daniel, Denis,
and Naveen, 2010) evidence suggests that managers may take actions to maintain dividend
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payments that are detrimental to bondholders, such as taking on additional debt or cutting
investment expenditures. Traditional event study techniques would not be equipped to deal
with measuring such non-events. However, given that the conditional event study method-
ology employed in this study measures the difference between the announcement the firm
chooses and what the market was anticipating, measuring these types of passive actions is
fairly straightforward.
Overall, the results from my event study tests demonstrate that dividend increases rep-
resent a transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders. For example, at the [-2,+2]
event window, debtholders lose -7.52 basis points (bps) on average, while shareholders gain
56.03 bps. While a loss of -7.52 bps may seem modest, as the average market value of debt
for firms in my sample is $8.44 billion, the typical loss of bondholders’ wealth at these
announcements is approximately $6.34 million. Thus, while dividend increases do not
represent pure wealth transfers, as shareholders gains outstrip bondholders’ losses, at least
some portion of the value earned by shareholders appears to be expropriated from debthold-
ers. The event study results from the announcement of a dividend cut yield inconclusive
results. In smaller event windows (e.g [-1,+1]), dividend cuts appear to be reverse wealth
transfers with bondholders earning positive, albeit statistically insignificant, abnormal re-
turns while shareholders clearly lose. Yet, in longer windows (e.g. [-3,+3]), bondholders
appear to lose wealth as well, although the results are again statistically insignificant. How-
ever, additional evidence from dividend omissions seems to hint at dividend reductions as
being negative signals. As my results indicate that dividend increases are wealth transfers
on net and dividend decreases show no consistent evidence of being negative signals for
bondholders, my findings appear to contradict the conclusions reached by Handjinicolaou
and Kalay (1984).
I next estimate a conditional event study model similar to the one designed by Nayak
and Prabhala (2001) to handle managers’ self-selection into particular dividend and earn-
ings announcement decisions. The results from the conditional event study support the
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findings from the traditional event study. Specifically, the conditional model finds that un-
expected dividend increases cause bondholders to lose wealth while simultaneously ben-
efiting shareholders. However, the conditional event study regressions also demonstrate
that both investors’ abnormal returns are increasing in the size of the announced dividend
change. Thus, my results indicate that larger dividend increases are responded to more
positively than smaller dividend increases and larger dividend cuts yield more negative ab-
normal returns than smaller dividend decreases. Taken together, these results suggest that
while dividend increases are wealth transfers on average, the transfer of wealth is partially
mitigated by the signaling effect. These findings are consistent with theoretical signaling
models (e.g. Miller and Rock, 1985) which posit that the strength of the signal released at
a dividend announcement is a function of the dividend change. This result is also note-
worthy since it differs from prior studies examining bondholders’ reactions to alternative
payout mechanisms, such as share repurchases (Maxwell and Stephens, 2003) and spin-offs
(Maxwell and Rao, 2003). Similar to dividend payments, these alternative payout schemes
are thought to possibly contain both signaling and wealth transfer effects. However, these
studies demonstrate that these events represent a transfer of wealth on average and that
bondholders’ losses grow as the size of the payout increases. Thus, it seems that the im-
plicit costliness of maintaining a quarterly dividend payment makes dividend policy a more
credible signaling mechanism to bondholders relative to more transitory payout schemes.
To examine the passive expropriation hypothesis, I focus on the subsample of dividend
announcements that feature no change in the dividend payout. As passive expropriation is
caused by managerial inertia in cutting dividends, it should be present during announce-
ments where the firm states that it will not modify its established dividend level, despite the
fact that the market predicts that it will lower it. As the conditional event study approach
produces a measure of the market’s surprise relative to the actual dividend announcement,
it is possible to use this measure to test of passive expropriation. Consistent with passive
expropriation, I find that bondholders in firms that surprisingly declare that their dividend
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level will not change when a dividend cut is anticipated earn lower abnormal returns (-
7.36 bps) over the [-2,+2] event window than other bondholders (-1.67 bps). However,
while shareholders of firms that maintain their payout level when a cut is expected earn
higher abnormal returns (17.11 bps) compared to shareholders (0.69 bps) in firms that are
not expected to lower their dividend payment, the results are weak in terms of statistical
significance. To place the results for the bond market in context, note that the wealth loss
generated by the implicit dividend increase caused by passive expropriation is only slightly
less than the magnitude of the wealth loss experienced at an actual dividend increase an-
nouncements (i.e. -7.52 bps). Further testing finds that the use of debt to maintain an oth-
erwise unsustainable dividend level exacerbates bondholders’ losses while simultaneously
augmenting shareholders’ gains, suggesting that it may be one mechanism through which
passive expropriation reliably occurs. Therefore, passive expropriation appears to be a real
phenomenon that adversely affects bondholders while concurrently benefiting shareholders
under certain circumstances.
My study contributes to three different literatures. First, it adds to the extant work
on dividend policy in general. While a substantial amount of attention has been dedi-
cated to how dividend policy affects shareholders, there is a relative dearth of evidence on
how dividend policy affects debtholders’ wealth. This is especially concerning given the
wide-spread changes that have occurred since prior studies were completed. Therefore,
the current study aims to provide an updated, comprehensive account of how bondholders
react to dividend announcements in order to remedy this gap. Second, my study aug-
ments the corporate governance literature, and more specifically, the literature pertaining
to shareholder-bondholder conflicts. To date, this area has largely focused on risk-shifting
(i.e. investment policy) concerns, however my study is one of a select few to extend this
analysis to payout policy. Furthermore, my study is novel given that it is the first to test for
wealth transfers arising from managerial inertia in cutting or suspending dividends. The
third area that my study supplements is the use of conditional event study techniques. To
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my knowledge, this is the first study to apply the conditional event study framework to
a bond event study. While the conditional event study procedure seems to largely verify
the conclusions reached through the traditional event study approach, it nevertheless high-
lights the usefulness of conditional models in testing for the presence of value-relevant
“non-events”.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Chapter II, I outline how the
event sample is formed, discuss the methodology used for the event studies in both the
bond and stock markets, and introduce the conditional event study regression framework.
In Chapter III, I present the event study results. In Chapter IV, I discuss the findings from
the conditional event study. Chapter V investigates the passive expropriation hypothesis
and Chapter VI concludes.
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CHAPTER II
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In the first section, I discuss how the event sample is formed and highlight the preva-
lence of joint dividend and quarterly earnings announcements within the sample. In the
second section, I provide an overview of how the event studies for both the bond and stock
markets are executed. In the third section, I introduce the conditional event study model
I will employ to deal with managers’ non-random choice of dividend (i.e. whether to in-
crease, decrease, or leave the dividend payout level unchanged) and earnings announcement
(i.e. whether to announce earnings joint with dividends or not) type.
Event Sample Construction
The sample of dividend announcing firms comes from the Center for Research in Se-
curity Prices (CRSP) events file. To be included in the sample, a firm must possess a share
code of either 10 or 11 (i.e. the firm must be incorporated in the United States and can-
not be either a real estate investment trust or closed-end fund) and announce the payment
of an ordinary cash dividend at a quarterly frequency (i.e. CRSP distribution code 1232).
To match the coverage of the daily bond return data discussed below, the sample period
spans from the start of July 2002 to the end of December 2012. Additionally, I require that
there be at least 30 calender days and no more than 184 calendar days between subsequent
quarterly dividend announcements.5
Besides providing announcement dates, the CRSP events file also supplies the an-
nounced dividend amount. I modify the reported dividend amount to account for non-
cash distributions such as stock splits and spin-offs and use the adjusted dividend amount
(Divad ji,t ) to determine the percentage change in dividends paid (∆Divi,t) as:
5I select a maximum of 184 days as it is the maximum number of days that can pass between the beginning
of one quarter to the end of the following quarter.
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∆Divi,t =
(
Divad ji,t −Divad ji,t−1
Divad ji,t−1
)
∗100 (1)
As shown in Panel A of Table 1, the sample is comprised of 8,611 dividend announce-
ments made by 503 different firms. Breaking down the announcements by the direction of
dividend change, it is obvious that the overwhelming majority of observations (7,006) fea-
ture no change in the dividend payout level whatsoever, which is consistent with the notion
that managers are generally adverse to modifying dividend policy unless material shifts in
the firm’s permanent income have occurred. Conditional on a positive change occurring
(1,521 observations), the average increase in the quarterly dividend is 31.31% on average
with a median change of 10.84%. Confirming prior findings of managerial reluctance to
cut dividends, there are only 84 dividend decreases in the sample; however, despite their
relative scarcity, the average reduction of -57.78% (median cut = -50.00%) is substantial in
magnitude.
Confounding Earnings Announcements
As earlier studies (e.g. Aharony and Swary, 1980) have indicated, one of the most
pervasive facts regarding dividend announcements is that they are often coupled near quar-
terly earnings announcements. As shown in Figure 1, this holds true in my sample as well
since nearly 12% of firms appear to release dividend and earnings announcements on the
exact same day. Extending this further, within the [-4,+4] dividend announcement event
window, approximately 38% of sample firms have chosen to make a quarterly earnings
announcement and in the [-7,+7] event window, around 48% of firms have made a joint
announcement in quarter t.
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Table 1: Dividend Event Summary Statistics. Summary statistics for the intersection of
firms covered by both the CRSP and TRACE databases are presented above. In Panel C, the
bond ratings on the left-hand side are from Moody’s while the those on the right-hand side
are from either Standard and Poor’s or Fitch. The bond classifications in Panel C include
any subranking included within the category (e.g. the Aa/AA group includes bonds rated
by Moody’s as Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 and bonds rated by Standard and Poor’s or Fitch as AA+,
AA, or AA-).
Panel A. Dividend Summary Statistics
Event Observations Mean Percentage Change Median Percentage Change
Positive Change 1,521 31.31% 10.84%
Negative Change 84 -54.53% -50.00%
No Change 7,006 0.00% 0.00%
8,611
Number of Firms 503
Panel B. Dividend Events by Year
Year Positive Change Negative Change No Change
2002 7 1 74
2003 53 2 344
2004 104 1 475
2005 168 7 736
2006 176 1 720
2007 157 3 696
2008 144 12 707
2009 110 27 806
2010 180 6 835
2011 211 9 845
2012 211 10 774
1,521 84 7,066
Panel C. Dividend Events by Bond Rating
Bond Rating Positive Change Negative Change No Change
Aaa/AAA 29 0 92
Aa/AA 64 1 220
A/A 511 7 1,888
Baa/BBB 644 39 2,918
Ba/BB 184 24 1,141
B/B and below 89 13 747
1,521 84 7,066
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Figure 1: Proportion of Firm that Jointly Announce Both Dividends and Earnings in
Dividend Event Time. Event date zero is the announcement of a quarterly dividend. The
height of the boxes indicate the proportion of firms with an earnings announcement on the
given event date.
Given the proximity of these events, executing an event study on dividend announce-
ments becomes more difficult as the reaction to the earnings announcements obscures the
amount of change in market value that occurs due to the dividend announcement. Tradi-
tionally, the method to deal with confounding events would be to eliminate announcements
contaminated by the secondary announcement from the sample. However, this method
has three disadvantages. First, as discussed by Kane et al. (1984), dividends and earnings
only provide crude signals about the firm’s future earnings. One manner for managers
to improve the quality of the signal they transmit is to strategically choose to release the
information together. This way investors have the opportunity to immediately determine
whether the individual signals corroborate or conflict one another. Consistent with this
idea, Kane et al. (1984) and Datta and Dhillon (1993) find evidence of a corroborative ef-
fect (e.g. positive (negative) dividend and earnings information released together generates
higher (lower) returns than either event announced separately) in the stock and bond mar-
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kets respectively. The interplay between these two signaling mechanisms is important to
consider in the current study since certain signaling outcomes will affect bondholders and
shareholders differently. For example, the announcement of a dividend increase coupled
with the firm missing analysts’ expectations may be the type of scenario where a wealth
transfer is most likely to occur. Therefore, it seems beneficial to control for the joint earn-
ings decision rather than simply discarding these observations.
One possible objection that could be raised is that the decision to joint announce earn-
ings and dividend information is not a choice that managers make for signaling purposes,
rather it is one that firms simply perform quarter after quarter. To provide some initial
evidence that the joint announcement decision acts as an additional signaling mechanism,
in Table 2, I determine the proportion of sample firms that choose to jointly announce
dividend and earnings together in quarter t and then subsequently choose to make joint
announcements in the following quarters. As can be seen, while there does appear to be
a non-trivial number of firms that consistently make joint announcements (about 15% of
firms jointly announce in quarters t, t+1, t+2, t+3, and t+4), there is also a substantial
reduction as each quarter progresses, suggesting that managers do select in and out of the
joint announcement decision.
The second reason for keeping these observations comes from Nayak and Prabhala
(2001). As the authors point out, expunging confounding observations from an event study
may not cure the problem of bias; but rather, only serve to introduce a new type into
the sample. Namely, as market participants are likely to create expectations about joint
announcements occurring, the non-occurrence of a predicted event can actually cause in-
vestors to react. The findings of Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) confirm this fact for dividend
and earnings announcements as the authors find that asymmetric information increases fol-
lowing expected joint announcements that do not occur. As traditional event study methods
are not equipped to determine if a particular event was expected to happen, non-events can
consequently contaminate a supposedly clean sample. Therefore, they recommend the use
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Table 2: Stability of Joint Dividend and Earnings Announcements Decisions Over
Time. The table below lists the proportion of sample firms which choose to jointly an-
nounce both dividend and earnings information during the [-7,+7] interval in dividend event
time across consecutive quarters.
Joint Announcement
Joint Announcement Joint Announcement Joint Announcement Joint Announcement in t, t-1, t-2, t-3,
in quarter t in t and t-1 in t, t-1, and t-2 in t, t-1, t-2, and t-3 and t-4
47.68% 29.89% 22.04% 17.43% 15.40%
of conditional event study methods for dealing with the issue of joint announcements. Fol-
lowing their suggestion, I employ a conditional event study approach in this study which is
described in more detail in a subsequent section.
Event Study Methodology
The daily stock return data necessary for the event study come from the CRSP daily
returns file. Abnormal stock returns (ARstocki,t ) are calculated as:
ARstocki,t = r
stock
i,t − βˆirvw,t (2)
where rstocki,t is the daily return for firm i on day t, βˆi is firm i’s estimated beta, and rvw,t
is the daily return of the CRSP value-weighted market index. As noted by Kothari and
Warner (2007), the choice of benchmark has little effect on the results of short-run event
studies, therefore the abnormal returns calculated in excess of the market model (Brown
and Warner, 1985) should not differ materially from abnormal returns derived from more
complicated benchmarking schemes.
Daily bond returns are formed using transaction-level data from the TRACE database.
As discussed by Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006), the TRACE database
was initiated by the National Association of Securities Dealers on July 1, 2002 at the behest
of the Securities and Exchange Commission as a means of improving the transparency of
the secondary bond market. At its inception, the TRACE database only covered 498 bond
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issues, but as of February 2005, it now covers nearly all over-the-counter bond transactions.
Panel B of Table 1 lists the number of dividend events by year for the intersection of firms
tracked by both the CRSP and TRACE databases. The limited coverage of the TRACE
database prior to 2005 is evident given the lower number of transactions in 2002, 2003, and
2004. Furthermore, the consequences of the recent financial crisis are clearly discernible
as the number of positive dividend changes fell, and the number of dividend cuts increased,
throughout 2008 and especially 2009.
Daily bond returns are formed using transaction-level data from the TRACE database
from July 2002 to December 2012. To calculate daily bond returns, I largely follow the
procedure established by Bessembinder et al. (2009). I begin by first dropping transactions
involving the debt of financial firms and bond issues with option-like features, such as
convertible debt and putable bonds, although it is worth noting that I do retain callable
bonds in my sample as they constitute a large percentage of the issues (around 47%) in my
sample. I also eliminate transactions in TRACE which are under $100,000 in volume as
well as all canceled, corrected, commission, and duplicate trades.
As a particular bond issue may trade multiple times in a given day, and therefore have
several recorded prices, I form a single daily price for each bond by weighting each trans-
action price by the dollar amount of its trade divided by the total daily dollar amount of
activity for that issue. From these trade-weighted prices (Ptw), I calculate the “dirty” hold-
ing period return for bond i on day t (rbondi,t ) using the following formula:
rbondi,t =
(
Ptwi,t −Ptwi,t−1
)
+AIi,t
Ptwi,t−1
(3)
where AIi,t is the amount of interest that has accrued over the holding period. My
decision to report dirty returns (i.e. returns that include accrued interest) is primarily based
on the fact that it most accurately reflects the returns that bondholders would experience
from the sale of a bond. Nevertheless, my results are robust to the use of “clean” returns
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(i.e. those that ignore accrued interest), which is not surprising given that the amount of
interest which will accrue over the holding period will typically be small relative to the
bond’s market price.
Given the illiquidity of the corporate bond market, it is often the case that a bond does
not trade at least once per day. Therefore, it is worth noting that the return calculated in
equation (2) may not be a daily return; rather it may represent a holding period return
calculated over several days. The fact that the last recorded transaction price for a bond
may be several days old raises the concern that returns calculated by equation (1) may be
biased due to stale pricing.6 To mitigate this concern, I impose two filters for a bond to
have a usable return. First, I require that a bond must have traded at least once in the past
month (i.e. 20 trading days), and second, I require that the bond issue must trade at least
once during the event window. I impose one final condition for a bond issue to have a
usable return; specifically, consistent with Bessembinder et al., I omit bonds with returns
greater than 20% in absolute value to reduce the influence of outliers.7
To calculate the abnormal bond returns (ARbondi,t ) for each issue, I first create twenty-four
benchmark portfolios sorted by credit rating and time-to-maturity. Benchmarking event
bonds’ returns to similar bonds based on credit rating and time-to-maturity controls for any
systematic factors that may influence either default risk or the term structure of interest
rates. The data necessary to determine the bond’s credit rating and time-to-maturity are ob-
tained from the Fixed Income Security Database (FISD) provided by Mergent. In the case
of a conflict between rating agencies, I use the Moody’s Inc. rating if available, followed
by the Standard & Poor’s rating, and finally the Fitch rating if the other two are unavail-
able. The benchmark portfolios are formed on a value-weighted basis using the returns
6Another potential issue is bid-ask bounce. However, as noted by Bessembinder et al., the elimination of
smaller trades and the use of transaction-weighted prices should largely mitigate these concerns.
7Bessembinder et al. (2009) find that the majority of cases where bonds have returns greater than 20%
in absolute value typically involve firms in default. Correspondingly, they do not likely represent the types
of returns financially healthy firms experience and are thus inappropriate for benchmarking. However, I find
little difference in my results if I extend the absolute value limit to 50%.
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calculated from all straight, industrial bonds included in TRACE. To ensure comparability
to the event bond returns, I require that the bonds that constitute the benchmark portfolios
meet the same selection criteria as the event bonds (e.g. they must be issued by an indus-
trial firm, they must have traded at least once in the past month) and, additionally, that they
have valid returns for both time t and t - 1. The benchmark portfolios are sorted into six
bins on the basis of credit rating (i.e. AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B and lower) and then each
credit rating category is further split into one of four groups (i.e. time-to-maturity between
one and three years, time-to-maturity between three and five years, time-to-maturity be-
tween five and ten years and time-to-maturity greater than ten years) based on the issue’s
time-to-maturity.
After obtaining the benchmark portfolios’ returns (rrate/ttmi,t ), each bond’s abnormal
holding period return is calculated as:
ARbondi,t = r
bond
i,t − rrate/ttmi,t (4)
Once again due to the illiquidity of the corporate bond market, abnormal returns are
computed on a holding period basis where the holding period may be of several days length.
For example, if a bond last traded seven days ago, its raw return would be calculated over
a seven day holding period and its benchmark return would similarly be computed over
the same seven-day interval. This approach ensures that bond returns are judged against
benchmark returns of comparable length.
While it is possible to execute a bond event study at the issue level, due to concerns
such as overweighting firms with multiple bond issues and having to correct for the cross-
sectional correlation between a particular firm’s different bond issues, Bessembinder et al.
(2009) advocate the use of firm-level rather than issue-level returns in bond event studies.
The firm-level approach has the added advantage of measuring the average total change
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in the market value of the firm’s debt as opposed to the average change in the value of a
particular debt issue which makes it particularly relevant for the current study.
To form the firm-level abnormal bond returns, I begin by constructing a linking table
which helps to correct for several difficulties in matching the data from TRACE and Mer-
gent FISD to the data from CRSP, such as variations in issuer CUSIPs8 and changes in debt
responsibility due to merger activity9, to ensure that my tests provide an accurate appraisal
of bondholders’ wealth changes at dividend announcements. After assigning each of my
sample firms the debt issues that they are obligated to pay, each firm is treated as a portfolio
of bonds in which the issue-level abnormal returns are weighted by their respective market
capitalizations. I will use these firm-level abnormal returns in my statistical testing. Fol-
lowing the advice of Bessembinder et al. (2009), I will test for the statistical significance
of the firm-level abnormal bond returns using the nonparametric sign and sign-rank tests
in addition to the standard t-test, as the authors find that nonparametric test have superior
ability in detecting abnormal performance in abnormal bond returns.
The Choice of Event Window
While the choice of a proper event window is crucial for any event study, it is particu-
larly imperative in a bond event study. Given the illiquidity of the corporate debt market,
8For instance, in CRSP, the only eight-digit CUSIP assigned to Abbott Laboratories over its history is
00282410, which implies an issuer identification, or base, of 002824 (i.e. the first six digits of the CUSIP).
However, Mergent FISD lists additional debt belonging to Abbott under the base of 002819. Therefore, the
linking table assigns debt under both the 002824 and 002819 bases to Abbott’s unique CRSP PERMCO
identifier.
9Consider the following example. The current company known as AT&T was formed from the merger of
SBC Communications and the old AT&T effective on 11/18/2005 and the merger of the aforementioned entity
with BellSouth effective on 12/29/2006. Currently, Mergent FISD has assigned all debt belonging to the new
AT&T to the parent ID of 19126. However, during some point in my sample period, the old AT&T, BellSouth,
and SBC Communications were all independent companies that paid a quarterly dividend. Therefore, to
properly determine the effect of a dividend announcement on bondholders’ wealth, it is necessary to ascertain
which entity had responsibility for a particular debt issue at a given point in time. This process is further
complicated by the fact that each of these firms has made prior acquisitions which need to be investigated.
My linking table establishes an ownership record for each debt issue and thus helps to properly assign its
returns to the correct firm.
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expanding the event window has the advantage of increasing the number of usable bond
issues; however, this comes at a cost as it simultaneously increases the likelihood of con-
founding information biasing the sample. Therefore, to help judge the appropriate window
length, Figure 2 displays the average and median daily dollar volume in dividend event
time. Panel A of Figure 2 shows the daily volume for the total sample, while Panel B
shows the volume for the sample excluding the dividend announcements made near earn-
ings announcements. I chose to examine the volume patterns for each sample separately in
order to assess whether the widespread presence of the quarterly earnings announcements
affects the event window selection.
Overall, the volume patterns appear to be roughly similar. In both cases, there appears
to be a detectable spike in volume on the dividend announcement day (i.e. event day 0)
followed by a decline in activity over event days +1 and +2. This is followed by a sharp
increase in volume over event days +3 and +4 before the volume once again decreases. In
order to capture, the spike in activity during days +3 and +4, I will investigate four different
symmetric windows starting from [-1,+1] to [-4,+4]. One noticeable difference across the
samples is that Panel A typically has a much smaller daily volume than the firms in Panel B.
Consistent with a signaling motivation, this is primarily due to the fact that joint announcers
tend to be smaller firms which usually have smaller debt issuances and less liquid bonds
(Sarig and Warga, 1989), which in turn lowers the average daily volume.10
Conditional Event Study Regressions
There are two particularly challenging aspects to determining how bondholders and
shareholders react to a dividend announcement. The first problem is that dividend an-
10In unreported results, I examine whether the joint announcement decision yields increased attention for
firms in the form of higher trading volume. Indeed, across firm size terciles, joint announcers tend to have
statistically higher dollar volume in both the bond and stock markets during the dividend event window
relative to non-joint announcers. For example, in the smallest size tercile, joint announcers witness a $31
million bump in dollar volume across the [-2,+2] event window compared to non-joint announcers.
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Figure 2: Average and Median Dollar Volume During Dividend Event Time. Event
date zero is the announcement of a quarterly dividend. Panel A depicts the average (boxes)
and median (line) dollar volume in dividend event time for the entire sample (i.e. includ-
ing firms with joint earnings and dividend announcements). Panel B displays the average
(boxes) and median (line) dollar volume for the sample of firms that do not have a contem-
poraneous earnings announcement during the [-7,+7] dividend event window.
Panel A. Average and Median Dollar Volume for Whole Sample.
Panel B. Average and Median Dollar Volume for Sample without Contemporaneous
Earnings Announcements.
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nouncements are not random decisions; rather, they are the result of firms self-selecting into
a dividend announcement type. The second issue is that dividend payments are often an-
nounced near quarterly earnings releases. Both of these concerns can affect the inferences
reached using standard event study techniques. In the first case, self-selection implies that
investors may be able to determine which firms will choose a particular announcement ac-
tion based on pre-announcement period observables. In well-functioning capital markets,
investors will impound this information into security prices which may lead to a somewhat
muted (i.e. biased) response when the announcement is actually made. In the second case,
information learned from the earnings announcement will contaminate the abnormal re-
turns calculated during dividend event time, potentially leading to erroneous conclusions
regarding the effect of dividend announcements on securityholders’ wealth. Thus, while
the traditional event study approach is useful in getting a broad assessment of the net effect
of a given announcement and has some limited ability to control for confounding events
(e.g. partitioning into subsamples), I will also employ the conditional event study method.
I execute a conditional event study utilizing regression techniques developed by Nayak
and Prabhala (2001) to deal with the aforementioned problems. To begin, I introduce a
self-selection model to predict the firm’s choice of a dividend. Following Lintner (1956),
Kumar and Lee (2001), and Hu and Kumar (2004), I assume that the dividend decision
made by management is a deliberate two-stage process. In the first stage, the manager
judges whether the firm’s expected permanent income is sufficient to support a change in
the payout level (i.e. the extensive margin) and then, conditional on a change being made,
decides on the appropriate magnitude of the change (i.e. the intensive margin).11 The man-
agers’ decision along the extensive margin is assumed to be determined by a latent variable,
Div∗i,t , which can be thought of as the utility management derives from making the dividend
11Taking a broader perspective, the decision to simply pay a dividend at all can be considered the extensive
margin decision. I do not include this selection into my framework since they represent changes in payout
policy versus modification of the firms current dividend policy and moreover movements along this margin
tend to be fairly rare (i.e. once a firm pays a dividend, it tends to continually pay). However, I do examine
dividend initiations and omissions in Appendix C.
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announcement.12 While Div∗i,t is imperceptible, market participants can nevertheless still
form expectations regarding managerial utility through a set of variables (wi,t−1) that are
publicly available prior to the announcement period. Thus, div∗i,t can be expressed as the
following linear function:
Div∗i,t = αwi,t−1 +ui,t (5)
where αwi,t−1 represents investors’ ex-ante expectations with respect to the benefit experi-
enced by firm i’s management from announcing a dividend payout and ui,t is an innovation
term that is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution and constitutes management’s
private information set.
Although managerial utility is unobservable, the decision they eventually undertake is
easily discernible. Specifically, managers can choose one of three potential dividend an-
nouncement options (indexed by j = {0,1,2} respectively); that is, they can either choose
to cut the dividend payment (C), leave the dividend payment unchanged (U), or increase
the dividend payout level (I). Therefore, managers’ dividend announcement decision can
be cast in terms of an ordered probit regression model, such that managers will:

choose I if Div∗i,t > µ2
choose U if µ1 ≤ Div∗i,t ≤ µ2
choose C if Div∗i,t < µ1
(6)
where µ j are unknown, but estimable, cutoff values.
12For the time being, I do not take any stance on whether management’s utility is aligned with the goal of
maximizing the value of shareholders’ equity as the degree to which this holds depends on the compensation
structure managers are given. Compensation variables will be included in the ordered probit model predicting
firms’ dividend choices to account for the fact that managers’ personal incentives may influence dividend
policy.
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Rather than being a direct focus itself, the primary function of the ordered probit model
is in determining the extent to which a given dividend announcement is anticipated by debt
and equity investors. Accordingly, following studies such as Kao and Wu (1990), I collect
the generalized residuals from the ordered probit model and include them as a regressor in
a set of cross-sectional regressions on abnormal bond and stock returns. In essence, this is
a control function approach where the generalized residuals from the ordered probit model
serve as an analog to the correction developed by Heckman (1979) to the omitted vari-
able problem induced by selection bias.13 Following Gourieroux, Monfort, Renault, and
Trognon (1987), the generalized residuals (λˆ divi,t ) for the dividend announcement ordered
probit model are calculated as:
λˆ divi,t =
φ(µˆ j− αˆwi,t−1)−φ(µˆ j+1− αˆwi,t−1)
Φ(µˆ j+1− αˆwi,t−1)−Φ(µˆ j− αˆwi,t−1) (7)
where φ (·) is the probability density function for the standard normal distribution andΦ(·)
is the cumulative density function for the standard normal distribution. Positive values of
λˆ divi,t represent unexpectedly high deviations from investors’ ex-ante predictions. Given
the choice set available to managers, this can either occur when the market anticipates
that the firm will cut dividends, but instead chooses to leave them untouched, or when
investors believe that the firm will leave its dividend the same, but the firm unexpectedly
increases its payout level. Conversely, negative values of λˆ divi,t will occur when the firm
chooses a dividend action that is below investors’ expectations, such as if the firm were to
cut dividends when no change is predicted or leave the dividend level the same when the
market is anticipating an increase.
As emphasized by Li and Prabhala (2007), the variable λˆ divi,t has a special interpretation
in the context of a conditional event study as it measures managers’ private information
released at the announcement. Accordingly, it provides an indicator of how investors’
13Indeed, as noted by Chiburis and Lokshin (2007), replacing µ j = 0 and µ j+1 = ∞ in equation (7) will
yield the familiar inverse Mills’ ratio.
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respond to the unexpected portion of the dividend announcement. For example, if both
debtholders and equityholders view unanticipated dividend increases as positive signals,
then the sign on the estimated coefficient of a regression of cumulative abnormal returns
against λˆ divi,t will be positive for both markets. However, if unforeseen dividend increases
benefit shareholders at the expense of bondholders, then the estimated coefficient will be
positive for the stock market and negative in sign for the bond market, indicating a wealth
transfer.
Having dealt with the non-randomness of the dividend announcement decision, it is
now possible to focus on the joint earnings announcement issue. I define an earnings an-
nouncement to have occurred simultaneously with a dividend announcement if the earnings
announcement takes place somewhere in the [-7,+7] event window in dividend event time.
I address the secondary announcement problem in two different ways. The first is a rela-
tively simple approach following Dutordoir and Hodrick (2012). In their study, the authors
examine stock returns following the announcement of either equity, convertible debt, or
straight debt financing using a switching regression model which is very similar to the self-
selection model discussed above. In their sample, they have a number of contaminated
observations (e.g. approximately 39% of the straight debt offerings in the sample are near
another material corporate event). To deal with this issue, Dutordoir and Hodrick simply
include an indicator variable into their cross-sectional regressions to control for the pres-
ence of a secondary event. In a similar manner, I include two indicator variables into my
cross-section regression specifications to control for the presence of joint meet-or-beat or
missed earnings announcements. As the omitted category is dividend announcements that
are made separate from an earnings announcement, the estimated coefficients of the two
indicator variables measure the incremental value that a joint earnings announcement adds
to the abnormal returns earned following a dividend announcement.
Admittedly, the indicator variable approach is fairly crude since it fails to account for
the fact that the decision to jointly announce quarterly earnings is self-selected. Therefore,
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my second method of controlling for joint earnings announcements closely follows the
design used for modeling the dividend announcement choice. Specifically, I assume that
managers’ latent utility with respect to making a joint dividend and earnings announcement
(Earn∗i,t) can be thought of as a linear combination of the ex-ante information known to
capital market participants (zi,t−1) and managers’ private information (vi,t) such that:
Earn∗i,t = γzi,t−1 + vi,t (8)
Just as in the dividend announcement case, managers’ utility with respect to the earnings
announcement is unobservable, but nonetheless drives the observable earnings announce-
ment decision. Given the large body of evidence in the accounting literature which sug-
gests that managers possess a strong preference to either meet-or-beat analysts’ quarterly
earnings estimates (e.g. Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002), I assume that managers will al-
ways prefer to meet-or-beat analysts’ expectations rather than miss them. Additionally, as
announcing earnings joint with dividends will bring additional attention to the firm, man-
agers will prefer to announce jointly when the information they are signaling is good and
will avoid announcing joint when it is poor. This creates four potential outcomes which are
ordered from most preferred to least: (i.) announce dividends jointly with a meet-or-beat
announcement (MBJ), (ii.) announce a meet-or-beat away from the dividend announcement
(MBS), (iii.) announce the miss of quarterly earnings targets separately (MS), and (iv.) an-
nounce a miss together with a dividend (MJ). Taken in whole, managers are assumed to
pursue the following joint announcement strategy set:14
14In unreported results, I tested an alternative specification that treats the joint announcement decision as
an independent self-selection decision (i.e. estimates a generalized residual term from a probit model with a
dependent variable equal to one if the firm jointly announces and zero otherwise) and interacts the surprise
from the joint announcement with the announced earnings surprise. In essence, this specification decouples
the joint announcement decision from the sign of the earnings surprise announcement. Ultimately, my results
were materially unaffected by this modification.
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
choose MBJ if Earn∗i,t > µMBS
choose MBS if µMS ≤ Earn∗i,t ≤ µMBS
choose MS if µMJ ≤ Earn∗i,t ≤ µMS
choose MJ if Earn∗i,t < µMJ
(9)
Similar to the dividend event choice, the following system can be estimated in an or-
dered probit regression framework and its generalized residuals computed to form a vari-
able (i.e. λˆ earni,t ) which measures the amount of surprise market participants experience from
a given earnings announcement decision. To control for the fact that the latent dividend and
earnings functions described by equations (5) and (8) are subject to common shocks, the
order probit equations described by equations (6) and (9) will be jointly estimated.
As discussed in Acharya (1988), given that investors expectations are being captured
by the generalized residual terms and assuming that capital markets are informationally
efficient, abnormal bond and stock returns should not be affected by ex-ante variables.
Therefore, the only variables that should enter into the conditional event study specifica-
tions are those that are revealed at the time of the announcement.15 These variables would
include the extensive margin dividend decision (i.e. whether to increase, decrease, or leave
the dividend untouched, as measured by λˆ divi,t ), the intensive margin dividend decision (i.e.
the size of the announced dividend change, DivChgi,t), and any information released via the
quarterly earnings announcements. Thus, the systems of cross-sectional regression specifi-
cations listed in equations (10) and (11) will form the basis of my analysis:
CARbondi,t = β0 +β1DivChgi,t +β2λˆ
div
i,t +β3Meet or Beati,t +β4Missedi,t + εi,t
CARstocki,t = δ0 +δ1DivChgi,t +δ2λˆ
div
i,t +δ3Meet or Beati,t +δ4Missedi,t +νi,t
(10)
where CARbondi,t and CAR
stock
i,t are the cumulative abnormal returns for the bond and stock
market respectively, Meet or Beati,t is an indicator variable which is equal to one if the firm
15However, in some testing situations I do utilize interaction terms between ex-ante variables and those
only discovered following the announcement.
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announces a joint meet-or-beat earnings announcement and zero otherwise and Missedi,t
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm announces that they missed their quarterly
earnings target near the dividend announcement and zero otherwise. My preferred specifi-
cation, due to the fact that it explicitly controls for the joint announcement decision, is:

CARbondi,t = β0 +β1DivChgi,t +β2λˆ
div
i,t +β3λˆ
earn
i,t + εi,t
CARstocki,t = δ0 +δ1DivChgi,t +δ2λˆ
div
i,t +δ3λˆ
earn
i,t +νi,t
(11)
where the variables are the same as defined above.
The standard errors of the estimated coefficients from equations (10) and (11) will be
biased due to the presence of generated regressors (e.g. λˆ divi,t ). As Pagan (1984) notes, the
presence of generated regressors does not bias the parameter estimates, but does render the
standard errors of the parameter estimates inconsistent. Therefore to correct my standard
errors for the presence of generated regressor bias, I bootstrap the regression standard errors
using 1,000 replications (Hill, Adkins, and Bender, 2003).
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CHAPTER III
TRADITIONAL EVENT STUDY RESULTS
In the first section, I discuss the event study results for the entire sample. Given the ex-
tensive presence of quarterly earnings releases near dividend announcements, in the second
section, I partition abnormal bond and stock returns into bins based on the firm’s dividend
and earnings announcement choice.
Basic Event Study Results
Table 3 lists the cumulative abnormal returns for the entire sample across several dif-
ferent event windows. The results in Panel A show the response of the stock market to
dividend announcements. Overall, the results in Panel A appear to be consistent with pre-
vious studies documenting the stock market’s reactions to dividend changes. On average,
dividend increases are received positively by the stockholders, garnering cumulative ab-
normal returns ranging from 50.28 basis points at the [-1,+1] event window to 59.49 bps
at the [-4,+4] event window. In economic terms, as the average market value of equity in
my sample is approximately $24.30 billion, the mean gain in shareholder wealth from a
dividend increase at the [-2,+2] window is nearly $136.13 million. The results in Panel A
also show that dividend cuts earn negative abnormal stock returns of -212.69 to -368.38
bps depending on the event window. This is in line with prior studies (e.g. Jensen, Lund-
strum, and Miller, 2010) which document a strong negative reaction from shareholders
when dividends are reduced.
Comparing the magnitudes of the results in Panel A to prior work, Grullon et al. (2002)
find cumulative abnormal returns over a [-1,+1] event window of -371.00 bps for dividend
cuts and 134.00 bps for dividend increases. The fact that there is a sizable difference in
magnitude between the results presented in Grullon et al. (2002) and Table 2 for dividend
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Table 3: Event Study Results by Type of Dividend Announcement. Average cumulative
abnormal returns are stated in basis points. Median cumulative abnormal returns for the
event window are reported in italics and are also stated in basis points. The p-values from
two-sided t-tests, sign tests, and sign-rank tests are reported below in parenthesis (), braces
{}, and brackets [], respectively. A dagger (i.e †) next to the p-value from either the sign or
sign-rank test indicates that over 50% of the observations are negative in sign.
Panel A. Abnormal Returns - Stocks Panel B. Abnormal Returns - Bonds
Dividend Event Windows Event Windows
Announcement Choice [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-3,+3] [-4,+4] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-3,+3] [-4,+4]
Positive 50.28 56.03 57.73 59.49 -5.12 -7.52 -7.49 -10.21
31.63 40.79 47.97 64.56 -4.52 -3.21 -3.42 -7.61
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.123) (0.046) (0.078) (0.028)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.006}† {0.064}† {0.068}† {0.001}†
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]† [0.024]† [0.051]† [0.001]†
Obs. 1,521 1,522 1,524 1,526 1,521 1,522 1,524 1,526
Negative -273.39 -368.38 -350.00 -212.69 18.39 11.64 -39.26 -40.99
-92.17 -198.63 -118.15 -103.35 6.37 7.60 -15.93 -26.42
(0.051) (0.033) (0.037) (0.086) (0.550) (0.759) (0.298) (0.646)
{0.052}† {0.025}† {0.007}† {0.237}† {0.826} {0.510} {0.510}† {0.124}†
[0.012]† [0.036]† [0.006]† [0.088]† [0.573] [0.730] [0.238]† [0.345]†
Obs. 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
No Change 5.46 4.14 6.33 10.29 -1.81 -2.86 -5.60 -7.45
0.70 0.02 0.90 2.05 0.79 -1.57 -2.80 -2.31
(0.189) (0.417) (0.279) (0.121) (0.320) (0.172) (0.018) (0.003)
{0.858} {1.000} {0.849} {0.784} {0.396} {0.148}† {0.015}† {0.130}†
[0.708] [0.952] [0.683] [0.677] [0.861] [0.033]† [0.003]† [0.008]†
Obs. 7,006 7,010 7,017 7,028 7,006 7,010 7,017 7,028
increases is likely due to sample construction. The firms currently under study are specifi-
cally limited to those that have both issued publicly-traded debt and are dividend payers. As
has been extensively documented, both types of firms tend to be larger in size relative to the
universe of publicly-traded firms. Given that larger firms experience lower announcement
period returns at dividend announcements (Haw and Kim, 1991), the smaller magnitude of
cumulative abnormal stock returns across events is expected.
Panel B of Table 3 lists the cumulative abnormal returns earned by the bondholders fol-
lowing dividend announcements. The results of Panel B indicate that bondholders tend to
lose wealth when dividends are increased. Across event windows, debtholders lose between
-5.12 to -10.21 bps, on average. In terms of total wealth, given that the average market value
of debt in the current sample is $8.44 billion, bondholders losses are approximately $6.34
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million on average over the [-2,+2] event window. As the announcement of a dividend
increase causes equityholders to gain while debtholders lose, my results indicate that divi-
dend increases are transfers of wealth, on average. While the increase in shareholder value
exceeds the absolute value of the losses to bondholders, indicating that dividend increases
do not appear to be primarily motivated by the desire to expropriate wealth from debthold-
ers, it is nevertheless the case that a non-trivial portion of shareholders’ gains come from
bondholders’ losses. Overall, my findings stand in contrast to the results of Handjinicolaou
and Kalay (1984) who find positive, but statistically insignificant, abnormal bond returns
from the announcement of a dividend increase.
The response to dividend cuts appears to be mixed for bondholders. The returns from
the tighter event windows (i.e. [-1,+1] and [-2,+2]) show evidence of positive, although
statistically insignificant, abnormal bond returns. However, the empirical results from
longer event windows (i.e. [-3,+3] and [-4,+4]) show debtholders earning negative and
statistically insignificant abnormal returns. Therefore, it appears to be difficult to ascertain
precisely how bondholders react to dividend decreases. However, as Handjinicolaou and
Kalay (1984) find statistically significant evidence that dividend cuts act as strong negative
signals to bondholders and shareholders, my findings once again appear to diverge from
theirs.
The final results in Table 3 pertain to dividend announcements that feature no change
in the stated payout level. While most studies ignore these events, as they are thought to
provide no new information to capital markets about firms’ payout policy, they nonetheless
play a special role in this study. Specifically, to the extent that passive expropriation ex-
ists, it will occur when the firm is expected to cut its dividend level, but decides to leave
it untouched. Therefore, if present, it will happen during announcements featuring no an-
nounced change to dividend policy. Overall, the results in both the bond and stock market
appear to be consistent with the idea of these events being of low informational value. For
the most part, they tend to feature small, statistically insignificant returns. However, this is
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not surprising. While passive expropriation may exist, it is likely not pervasive enough to
show up so easily in the cross-section. Therefore, in Chapter V, I will direct more focused
tests on this subsample to test for passive expropriation.
Event Study Results Partitioned by Dividend and Earnings Announcement Choice
While the results from the previous section were helpful in gauging how debtholders
and equityholders react to dividend announcements on net, the sample contained numerous
instances of dividend announcements that were made near quarterly earnings announce-
ments. The purpose of this section is to provide a sense for how the interplay between the
dividend and earnings announcements chosen by the firm affect abnormal bond and stock
returns.
To accomplish this, in Tables 4 and 5, I sort the cumulative abnormal returns for the
stock and bond markets, respectively, into bins based on the dividend and earnings choices
given to managers; that is, firms can choose to either increase, reduce, or leave their divi-
dend payment unchanged and they can choose to announce either a meet-or-beat earnings
announcement separately or jointly or announce a miss of analysts’ expectations separately
or jointly. Firms are judged to have either meet-or-beat or missed their earnings targets by
examining the sign of their surprise unexpected earnings (SUE), which is determined by:
SUE =
(
EPSacti,t −EPSµi,t
EPSµi,t
)
∗100 (12)
where EPSacti,t is the actual earnings per share (EPS) firm i announces in quarter t and
EPSµi,t is the last consensus average of analysts’ EPS forecasts for firm i in quarter t. The
data used to construct SUE come from the I/B/E/S database. A firm is considered to have a
meet-or-beat announcement if SUE ≥ 0 and to have missed their earnings target if SUE <
0. I include the mean dividend change and SUE in each category to help ascertain whether
the results are driven by the magnitude of the announced dividend or earnings change.
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The results of Tables 4 and 5 show that the decision to announce jointly seems to be
more a function of the strength or weakness of the firm’s earnings quality (as measured
by SUE) versus the magnitude of the dividend change as joint meet-or-beat (missed) an-
nouncements have greater (lower) SUEs than stand alone announcements. This finding
suggests that managers may self-select into the joint earnings decision in order to high-
light particularly good earnings information. Correspondingly, this suggests that variables
related to the financial performance of the firm should help to positively predict the joint
announcement decision. Additionally, in Table 4, the pattern of the abnormal stock returns
seems to broadly conform to ordering assumed in equations (6) and (9); that is, abnormal
returns are usually larger as one moves from the dividend decreases to dividend increases
and as one moves from joint announcements featuring an earnings miss to joint meet-or-
beat announcements.
While there appears to be evidence of a corroborative effect in the stock market, since
the lowest average abnormal returns (-798.17 bps) in Table 4 are earned in dividend cut/joint
missed earnings bin and the highest average abnormal returns (134.59 bps) are generated in
the dividend increase/joint meet-or-beat category, the corroborative effect does not seem to
be present in the bond market on average. Indeed, in Table 5, abnormal bond returns reach
their extremes during non-corroborative scenarios. Bondholders’ average returns are high-
est (85.39 bps) in the dividend cut/meet-or-beat bin, suggesting that debtholders do best
when the firm reduces its payouts to shareholders, but also provide evidence that earnings
are strong enough to meet current debt obligations. As equityholders lose wealth on aver-
age at these types of announcements (albeit statistically insignificant), there is some cursory
evidence of a reverse wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders. Conversely, bond-
holders’ losses (-26.52 bps) are greatest in announcements where the dividend is increased
and the firm announces that they have missed analysts’ earnings expectations. This in-
creases concern for bondholders over default risk as the firm is committing to a higher div-
idend payout level while simultaneously signaling that the company’s earnings are weaker.
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However, on net, these events do not appear to be a wealth transfer, since shareholders
also view them very negatively (-169.56 bps, on average). When viewed as a whole, the
results of Tables 4 and 5 point to shareholders doing better when placed in to higher or-
dered dividend categories, while bondholders seem to prefer being in lower ordered groups.
Thus, based on the results of Tables 4 and 5, I anticipate that my conditional event study
tests will find that positive, unexpected dividend information will be value-increasing for
equityholders, but value-decreasing for debtholders.
Although Table 4 provides a general sense of how managerial decisions regarding div-
idend and earnings announcements affect the abnormal returns earned by bondholders and
stockholders, it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions from the findings. This is due
to two factors. First, in many cases, the partitioning of announcements into groups leaves
certain cells with a small amount of observations (e.g. the dividend cut sample). This ad-
versely affects the power of the statistical test to detect abnormal performance and hence
the ability to draw inferences. While the paucity of observations will negatively influence
the statistical power for both sets of returns, it will be particularly harmful for the abnor-
mal bond returns given their well-documented power issues in small samples (Bessem-
binder et al., 2009). Second, the table does not control for cross-sectional heterogeneity
in investors’ expectations regarding the dividend-earnings announcement choice (i.e. self-
selection) nor does it take into account the magnitude of the announced dividend change.
As both of these variables are likely relevant in explaining investors’ abnormal returns, it
is necessary to turn to the conditional event study approach.
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Table 4: Stock Event Study Results by Dividend and Earnings Announcement Choice. Event study results from the [-2,+2] event
window are presented below. Average cumulative abnormal returns are stated in basis points. Median cumulative abnormal returns for
the event window are reported in italics and are also stated in basis points. The p-values from two-sided t-tests, sign tests, and sign-rank
tests are reported below in parenthesis (), braces {}, and brackets [], respectively. A dagger (i.e †) next to the p-value from either the
sign or sign-rank test indicates that over 50% of the observations are negative in sign. Dividend change refers to the average dividend
change experienced by the subsample, while surprise unexpected earnings (SUE) measures the average difference of firm’s announced
earnings from the average analysts’ expectation scaled by the mean of analysts’ last forecasts prior to the announcement.
Earnings Announcement Choice
Dividend Missed & Missed & Meet-or-Beat & Meet-or-Beat &
Announcement Announced Joint Announced Separate Announced Separate Announced Joint
Decrease -798.17/-43.73 -288.55/-355.95 -106.03/-57.96 -9.00/-203.38
(0.249) [1.000] {0.355} (0.298) [0.031]† {0.170}† (0.205) [0.845]† {0.248}† (0.968) [0.481]† {0.500}†
Obs. 22 18 26 18
Dividend Change/SUE -53.46%/-81.65% -60.66%/-40.44% -52.76%/42.65% -52.25%/90.18%
No Change -111.08/-92.17 -20.07/-18.14 -0.34/2.75 59.75/36.31
(0.000) [0.000]† {0.000}† (0.106) [0.018] {0.030} (0.956) [0.586] {0.975} (0.000) [0.000] {0.000}
Obs. 857 1,058 2,645 2,450
Dividend Change/SUE 0.00%/-46.49% 0.00%/-39.45% 0.00%/19.83% 0.00%/26.69%
Increase -169.56/-69.92 64.67/48.56 41.66/28.89 134.59/95.51
(0.000) [0.099]† {0.001}† (0.012) [0.072] {0.007} (0.001) [0.001] {0.000} (0.000) [0.000] {0.000}
Obs. 162 164 633 563
Dividend Change/SUE 17.69%/-17.34% 26.31%/-15.59% 38.77%/9.73% 28.37%/11.02%
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Table 5: Bond Event Study Results by Dividend and Earnings Announcement Choice. Event study results from the [-2,+2] event
window are presented below. Average cumulative abnormal returns are stated in basis points. Median cumulative abnormal returns for
the event window are reported in italics and are also stated in basis points. The p-values from two-sided t-tests, sign tests, and sign-rank
tests are reported below in parenthesis (), braces {}, and brackets [], respectively. A dagger (i.e †) next to the p-value from either the
sign or sign-rank test indicates that over 50% of the observations are negative in sign. Dividend change refers to the average dividend
change experienced by the subsample, while surprise unexpected earnings (SUE) measures the average difference of firm’s announced
earnings from the average analysts’ expectation scaled by the mean of analysts’ last forecasts prior to the announcement.
Earnings Announcement Choice
Dividend Missed & Missed & Meet-or-Beat & Meet-or-Beat &
Announcement Announced Joint Announced Separate Announced Separate Announced Joint
Decrease 18.28/-18.57 53.69/61.50 -74.16/-7.16 85.39/53.91
(0.803) [0.664]† {0.417}† (0.568) [0.238] {0.122} (0.345) [0.845]† {0.469}† (0.104) [0.238] {0.199}
Obs. 22 18 26 18
Dividend Change/SUE -53.46%/-81.65% -60.66%/-40.44% -52.76%/42.65% -52.25%/90.18%
No Change -22.39/-5.80 0.56/-2.19 2.96/1.19 3.35/3.94
(0.003) [0.056]† {0.001}† (0.920) [0.341]† {0.678}† (0.335) [0.392] {0.452} (0.342) [0.031] {0.096}
Obs. 857 1,058 2,645 2,450
Dividend Change/SUE 0.00%/-46.49% 0.00%/-39.45% 0.00%/19.83% 0.00%/26.69%
Increase -26.52/-6.01 -8.89/0.32 -1.05/-3.94 -8.93/-3.09
(0.080) [0.099]† {0.001}† (0.328) [1.000] {0.788} (0.847) [0.189]† {0.167}† (0.162) [0.189]† {0.234}†
Obs. 162 164 633 563
Dividend Change/SUE 17.69%/-17.34% 26.31%/-15.59% 38.77%/9.73% 28.37%/11.02%
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CHAPTER IV
CONDITIONAL EVENT STUDY RESULTS
In this chapter, I estimate the conditional event study. In the first section, I provide
an overview of the variables that I will be using to predict firms’ dividend and earnings
announcement choices. In the second section, I briefly discuss the result from the ordered
probit models. Finally, in the third section, I present the conditional event study results.
Variable Selection for Ordered Probit Models
The first step in undertaking the conditional event study approach is to estimate the
ordered probit regressions predicting firms’ dividend and earnings announcement choices.
This necessitates the collection of a relevant set of variables that capital market investors
may use in forecasting managers’ announcement decisions. Given that very few studies
attempt to predict firms’ dividend announcement choices,16 I take a broad approach in de-
termining potential regressors. Therefore, in this section, I discuss the variables employed
in forming investors’ information sets. As the goal of estimating the ordered probit models
is to gauge investors’ expectations, all of the measures discussed below are lagged one quar-
ter back to mitigate concerns over look-ahead biases and to avoid any potential mechanical
relationships emerging between the announcement decisions and the prediction variables.
A complete inventory of how the variables are calculated is provided in Appendix A.
Financial Variables
The first group of variables I consider are measures of the financial health of the firm.
These include measures of the firm’s leverage (Leverage), earnings (Net Income), and level
16Li and Lie (2006) and Li and Zhao (2008) are notable exceptions.
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of cash holdings (Cash). I expect the likelihood of a dividend increase to be negatively
related to leverage and positively related to its earnings and cash holdings. Based on the
work of DeAngelo et al. (2006) on the life-cycle hypothesis of dividends, I also add the
ratio of retained earnings to total assets (Ret Earn). According to the life-cycle hypothesis,
an increase in this ratio should be associated with a higher propensity to increase dividends.
As this study focuses on leveraged firms, I also include several variables that specifi-
cally relate to the firm’s ability to repay its debt obligations. The first variable is an indicator
equal to one if the firm has a non-investment grade credit rating (Non-Invest). Besides con-
trolling for the firm’s current credit rating, I also include a variable that indicates whether
the firm has experienced a ratings downgrade over the past year (Downgrade). Last, as
debtholders may be concerned that dividend payments may inhibit the ability of the firm to
make its interest payments, I add a variable which denotes whether the firm has a negative
interest coverage ratio (IC Neg). Overall, I expect each of these measures to be negatively
related to the firm’s decision to increase its dividend.
Early work dealing with the agency conflicts that can emerge in a leveraged firm (e.g.
Handjinicolaou and Kalay, 1984) pointed out that dividend increases that were made by
either issuing new debt or cutting investment expenditures could be especially harmful to
bondholders. Therefore, I incorporate variables to account for these possibilities. The first
variable, Debt Chg, measures the percentage change in the firm’s total debt (i.e. short-term
plus long-term) that takes place in the previous quarter. Yet, given that prior studies, such
as Long, Malitz, and Sefcik (1994), have not found any evidence that debt increases lead to
explicitly higher payouts, I do not expect Debt Chg to positively predict dividend increases.
The second variable, Underinvest, indicates if a firm is investing less than the average firm
in its two-digit SIC code defined industry. I do not have an expectation regarding the sign
that Underinvest will take in the ordered probit regressions. While investment cuts may be
used to fund dividend increase, it is also possible that decreases in capital expenditure may
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be due to financing constraints which would suggest that underinvestment will negatively
predict dividend increases.
The last four financial variables considered are firm i’s stock return (Return) over the
previous quarter, an indicator signifying if the firm was a net equity repurchaser (Repur-
chase) in the past quarter, the firm’s market-to-book ratio (MTB), and the firm’s size (Size).
As prior studies (e.g. Nayak and Prabhala, 2001) have found that firms that increase their
dividend usually have a significant stock price run-up, I expect that Return will positively
predict a dividend increase. The expected sign on Repurchase is ambiguous as firms that
are actively repurchasing shares may be more likely to increase their dividend payouts as
the repurchase activity indicates improved cash flow, however it may also be negative if
firms view repurchases and dividends as substitutes. I anticipate that the estimated sign
for MTB will be negative since it acts as a proxy for Tobin’s q, lowering the likelihood
of increasing the dividend payout as higher values imply the firm has a greater number of
profitable investment to undertake. Finally, given the results of prior work (e.g. Fama and
French, 2001), I expect the propensity to increase dividends to be positively related to the
firm’s size.
Corporate Governance Variables
The next set of variables I turn my attention toward are measures of the firm’s corporate
governance environment. Each of the three measures considered is related to managerial
entrenchment. As discussed by Klock et al. (2005) and Chava et al. (2010), in contrast
to shareholders, bondholders often prefer entrenched managers due to the fact that they
are less likely to subject debtholders to costly anti-takeover maneuvers and they pay out
less (Francis et al., 2011). Thus, variables that reflect more entrenched management will
likely lower the probability of a dividend increase. My first variable is the proportion of
independent directors that sit on the firm’s board of directors (Board Indep). I chose the
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independence of the board as a regressor because independent boards are thought to serve
as a check against managerial power and the board has a direct role in setting the firm’s
payout policy (Allen and Michaely, 2003).
My second variable is based on the results of Chava et al. (2010). Specifically, Chava
et al. investigate the determinants of various bond covenants and find that longer tenured
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are less likely to have restrictive dividend covenants
placed on their debt. Therefore, I add CEO Tenure as a regressor under the expectation
that longer tenured CEOs are more entrenched and hence less likely to announce a divi-
dend increase.
My final variable is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding equity that is owned by
its top five institutional bondholders (IO Top 5%). Institutional investors are often thought
to have a preference for dividend-paying firms due to either an advantageous tax status
or concerns over meeting prudent-man standards. Consequently, as powerful sharehold-
ers, they may influence firms’ payout policy toward their own ends (Desai and Jin, 2011).
While prior studies (Grinstein and Micheaely, 2005; Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan,
2009) have typically found that increased institutional ownership does not lead to higher
payout levels, more recent studies (e.g. Crane et al., 2012; Gaspar et al., 2013) have found
otherwise. Alternatively, as Amihud and Li (2006) show, the increase in institutional in-
vestment over time has improved the information environment of firms and lessened the
need for managers to use dividends as a signaling mechanism. Thus, the anticipated sign
on the institutional ownership variable is ambiguous.
In addition to the governance measures listed above, I also include a variable to control
for the presence of restrictive dividend covenants (Dividend Covt).17 As the abnormal
17One unfortunate consequence of using firm-level abnormal bond returns is that issue-level information is
often swept away through the aggregation. This is costly as it obscures pontentially economically interesting
relationships. While covenants fall victim to this problem, another casualty is the maturity structure of the
firm’s debt. As long-term debtholders have greater sensitivity to changes in the firm’s future cash flows,
whether dividend increases act as signals or wealth transfers, they are likely to be more affected to dividend
policy changes than short-term debtholders. Moreover, not only will maturity structure affect bondholders’
reactions to dividend announcements, they will also affect managers’ likelihood of selecting into certain
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bond returns that I utilize in my cross-sectional regressions are based at the firm-level, the
dividend covenant variable is the proportion of firm i’s debt that has a dividend covenant in
place. It is worth noting that dividend covenants do not explicitly restrict the payment of
dividends, but rather define an inventory of funds that are able to be paid over the life of the
bond.18 Therefore, while it is intuitive to think that the presence of dividend covenants may
inhibit managers ability to increase dividends, so long as the firm has a positive reservoir
of funds available to them, the dividend covenant will not be binding.19
Managerial Compensation Variables
As prior research has found that managerial compensation has a sizable role in shaping
payout policy, it is crucial to consider how managers’ compensation affects their incentives
to modify to dividend policy. To capture the complex relationship between managerial
compensation and dividend policy, I consider three different aspects of the compensation
package.
First, I consider how much equity the firms’ top management owns (Owner). Brown,
Liang, and Weisbenner (2007) find that managers with greater equity ownership stakes in
their firms were more likely to increase dividend payments following the 2003 dividend tax
cuts, which lowered the personal income tax rates on dividend payments. As my sample
dividend actions. While it is possible to control for the firm’s average maturity at the firm-level, this clearly
masks the fact that firms can have substantial heterogeneity in maturity across bond issues. Therefore, a
promising area for future research would be to conduct a similiar type of study at the issue-level.
18Smith and Warner (1979) note that the maximum amount of dividends (D∗t ) that are allowed to be paid
over the life of the bond (which begins at t = 0) with a dividend covenant in place is:
D∗t = k
(
t
∑
t=0
Et
)
+
(
t
∑
t=0
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)
+F−
(
t−1
∑
t=0
Dt
)
where Et is the firm’s net earnings for quarter t, St is proceeds from any stock issuances during the quarter, F
is a fixed number known as the “dip”, and k is a constant such that 0≤ k ≤ 1.
19Kalay (1982) finds that most firms do not pay themselves the maximum amount of dividends each quarter,
but rather tend to leave a substantial reserve around 12% of firm value.
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period covers the entire span of the 2003 dividend tax cut, I expect managers with greater
ownership stakes to have an increased likelihood of boosting the firm’s dividend payments.
Besides controlling for the ownership stake management holds, I also control for man-
agers’ wealth sensitivity to changes in market value (Delta). As demonstrated by Lambert,
Lanen, and Larcker (1989), managers that are paid with high amounts of equity option-
based compensation are less likely to increase dividends as the value of their options de-
creases as dividends are paid. Therefore, as option-based compensation typically leads to
greater wealth sensitivity of performance, I expect managers with high levels of Delta to
be less likely to increase the firm’s dividends. I also control for the sensitivity of managers’
compensation to the firm’s volatility (Vega). Intuitively, it is not clear whether managers
with higher levels of Vega will prefer higher dividend payouts. To the extent that divi-
dend payments are leverage increasing events and will increase the volatility of the firm,
they may desire higher payout levels; however, as noted by Liu and Mauer (2011), man-
agers with high sensitivity to firm volatility are often constrained into stockpiling liquidity,
suggesting that they may prefer lower dividend levels.
Signaling Variables
I include three variables to control for managers’ incentive to use dividends and earn-
ings announcements as signaling mechanisms. The first variable is a measure of analysts’
disagreement over the forecasted earnings of the firm (Dispersion) and the second measure
is the number of analysts covering the firm (Analyst). If managers wish to use dividends as
signals of firm value, then these signals will have the greatest value when either Dispersion
is high or analyst coverage is low. However, Li and Zhao (2008) find that there is actu-
ally a negative relationship between asymmetric information and the decision to increase
dividend payments, contrary to the theoretical signaling literature. Therefore, I expect the
sign on Dispersion to be negative and the sign on Analyst to be positive in the dividend or-
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dered probit model. The third signaling variable that I include is a dummy variable noting
whether the firm has multiple classes of stock trading (Dual Class). As Francis, Schip-
per, and Vincent (2005) both argue and document, the increased separation between voting
rights and cash flow rights in dual class firms affords managers greater secrecy, making
their earnings reports less informative. Therefore, these firms have a greater incentive to
use dividends to credibly convey earnings information to the market. Thus, I expect Dual
Class to positively predict dividend increases.
Other Variables
Given the results of Table 1, which show a noticeable change in dividend activity due to
the recent financial crisis, I use an indicator variable (Fin Crisis) to flag dividend and earn-
ings announcements that take place during this period. I follow Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy
(2010) and define the financial crisis as having occurred from July 2007 to March 2009.
More broadly, I also control for systematic changes in the default premium (Default Prem)
to account for any macroeconomic shocks that may affect firms’ probability of default. To
account for any time-varying dividend clientele effects, I add the dividend premium (Div-
idend Prem) from Baker and Wurgler (2004) into the ordered probit regressions as well. I
include a dummy variable (Tax Year) for observations in 2010 and 2012 to deal with the
uncertainty surrounding the extension of the 2003 dividend tax cuts that took place during
these years. Finally, both ordered probit regressions include fiscal quarter dummy variables
to control for any seasonality in dividend and earnings announcements.
To provide some unique variation to each of the ordered probit models, I added vari-
ables unique to each set of decisions. For the dividend order probit model, I included the
variable, Last Divd Act, which indicates whether the previous quarter featured a dividend
increase. As firms are unlikely to announce dividend increases in consecutive quarters, this
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variable should load negatively in the ordered probit model.20 For the earnings ordered
probit model, I include two unique regressors, Last Joint Ann and Last Earn Ann. The
first variable (i.e. Last Joint Ann) notes whether the firm made a joint dividend-earnings
announcement in the past quarter, while the second variable (i.e. Last Earn Ann) indicates
whether the firm made a meet-or-beat earnings announcement in the previous quarter.
Summary Statistics
Table 6 displays the mean and median values for the aforementioned variables parti-
tioned by dividend announcement type. Broadly speaking, the measures of financial health
appear to be strongest (e.g. have less leverage, more net income, greater cash holdings,
tend to be investment-grade, etc.) in firms that are going to announce a dividend increase in
the subsequent quarter and weakest in firms that will eventually reduce their dividend pay-
out. Overall, there appears to be little variation in the governance variables across dividend
types which suggests that they will not load significantly into the ordered probit model.
However, all three managerial compensation variables appear to increase in value over the
dividend announcement choices. Given the discussion in above, this is somewhat under-
standable for Owner and Vega, but difficult to rationalize for Delta. Finally, consistent with
the findings of Li and Zhao (2008), Dispersion and Analyst appear to move in the opposite
direction suggested by the theoretical signaling literature.
In the next section, I will use these variables to estimate the dividend and earnings
ordered probit models and form the generalized residual terms necessary to estimate the
conditional event study model.
20An alternative approach to capturing the dynamics of the dividend decision would be to model the dis-
tance of firm i’s current dividend payout ratio to its long-run average. As has been recognized since Lintner
(1956), and more recently formalized by Lambrecht and Myers (2012), managers typically have benchmark
dividend payout ratios (defined as the ratio of current dividends paid to current total earnings) that they
attempt to target over time. Therefore, if the current dividend-to-earnings ratio is lower than the firm’s his-
torical average, this is likely a good indicator that a dividend increase is becoming more probable. I believe
this alternative specification is worthy of additional investigation in subsequent work.
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Table 6: Firm-level Summary Statistics. The mean values of various firm-level variables are presented below. Median values are
presented in italics (medians are not reported for dummy variables). All variables are lagged one quarter back from their respective
dividend announcement. Details on variable construction can be found in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1-
and 99-percentile levels unless otherwise noted in Appendix A.
Continuous Variables Dummy Variables (in %)
Dividend Action Dividend Action Dividend Action
Variable Cut No Change Increase Variable Cut No Change Increase Variable Cut No Change Increase
Leverage 28.14 21.34 18.53 Board Indep 79.39 77.55 77.55 Non-invest 44.14 30.99 20.50
27.06 19.30 16.40 81.82 80.00 80.00 Downgrade 40.00 21.51 18.20
Cash 6.67 7.19 7.36 CEO Tenure 7.19 7.30 7.19 IC Neg 24.30 6.44 2.40
4.05 4.06 4.40 6.00 5.00 6.00 Underinvest 64.14 57.11 55.28
Net Income 0.20 1.35 1.90 Ownership 1.03 1.45 1.60 Repurchase 22.76 39.15 47.07
0.62 1.25 1.67 0.37 0.43 0.53 Dual Class 2.07 2.43 2.87
Retained Earn 20.62 26.93 30.58 Delta 1.16 2.02 2.16 Fin Crisis 28.28 17.00 15.75
19.65 25.06 28.63 0.40 0.78 0.99 Tax Year 15.17 17.72 20.58
Debt Change -0.11 2.52 2.12 Vega 0.40 0.59 0.69
-0.02 -0.10 -0.01 0.21 0.34 0.43
MTB 2.20 2.82 3.10 Dispersion 0.69 0.26 0.13
1.54 2.11 2.42 0.22 0.08 0.07
Return -6.24 2.82 3.32 Analyst 2.22 2.33 2.40
-4.13 2.51 3.23 2.30 2.40 2.48
Size 8.27 8.54 8.92 Dividend Prem 0.05 -1.14 -1.04
8.31 8.46 8.91 -3.48 -3.48 -3.61
Dividend Covt 11.79 12.47 8.70 Default Prem 3.58 2.70 2.61
0.00 0.00 0.00 3.26 2.64 2.56
IO Top 5% 27.01 27.47 25.61
26.05 26.12 24.41
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Ordered Probit Results
The estimated coefficients of the ordered probit are listed in Table 7. Overall, the fit
(pseudoR2= 10.90%) for dividend model is fairly good, especially given the dispropor-
tionate amount of no change dividend announcements in the sample. The fit (pseudoR2=
3.49%) for the earnings announcement model is less encouraging. This is likely due to
the fact that earnings model is attempting to not only only predict whether a manager will
meet-or-beat analysts’ expectations, but also predict if the manager will make the earnings
announcement jointly. However, as the estimation of the ordered probit model is only an
intermediary step in executing the conditional event study, rather than discussing each sta-
tistically significant variable in Table 7, I will focus my attention toward a few of the more
notable results.
First, in the dividend ordered probit model, while the vast majority of the financial
health variables ended up with their predicted signs, the cash holding variable loaded neg-
atively suggesting that, all else equal, firms with greater amounts of cash are less likely to
increase their dividend payments. While this result is counterintuitive, Li and Lie (2006)
also find a negative coefficient on cash when using a multinominal logit model to predict
dividend changes, which suggests that this finding is not specific to my sample.21 Second,
IO Top 5% and Vega both load negatively and are the only statistically significant variables
from the set of proposed corporate governance and managerial compensation measures.
The results for institutional ownership are consistent with the idea that while institutions
prefer firms that pay a dividend they are less concerned with how much is being paid (Grin-
stein and Micheaely, 2005). The results for Vega are in line with the findings of Liu and
Mauer (2011) which indicate that high Vega managers are more likely to horde liquidity
21One possible reason for this finding is that firms may be stockpiling cash in order to finance future
expenditures. Consequently, as they are in the process of saving internally generated cash flow, they are less
likely to announce a dividend increase.
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than to disburse it. Somewhat surprisingly, the financial crisis indicator variable did not
load significantly, but this is due to the presence of the default premium measure.
The results for the earnings ordered probit model indicate that the likelihood of mak-
ing a meet-or-beat joint decision is positively related to the firm’s financial standing. For
instance, firms that have less leverage, have greater stock price run-ups, have not experi-
enced a credit rating downgrade, and have recently been repurchasing shares are all more
likely to make positive joint announcements. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the deci-
sion to jointly announce meet-or-beat earnings near a dividend announcement is inversely
related to the size of the firm. This is consistent with a signaling motivation as smaller
firms have a greater incentive to reduce asymmetric information about their financial per-
formance. Also interesting is the fact that while analysts’ dispersion is negatively related to
the meet-or-beat joint earnings decision, contrary to the signaling hypothesis, the decision
is more likely the greater the number of analysts following the firm. Given that both Ofer
and Siegel (1987) and Ely and Mande (1996) find that analysts use dividend information to
help update their forecasts of future earnings, it makes sense that firms with greater analyst
coverage are more likely to cater to analysts’ desires to have both pieces of information
immediately available.
Conditional Event Study Results
After estimating the ordered probit models and computing their generalized residuals
according to equation (7), it is now possible to execute the conditional event study. The
cross-sectional regression results for the conditional event study are listed in Table 8. The
primary results are provided in models (1) and (2), which are the estimated versions of
equations (10) and (11) from Chapter 2. The first pertinent results to discuss are the esti-
mated coefficients on the dividend announcement surprise variable, λˆ divi,t . Across specifica-
tions (1) and (2), the estimated coefficients are positive for the stock market and negative
for the bond market. As the generalized residual measures the amount of surprise investors
49
Table 7: Ordered Probit Selection Models. Listed below are the results from the ordered
probit selection models. Details on the definition and construction of the regressors can be
found in Appendix A. To account for the correlation between the two decisions, the ordered
probit models are jointly estimated. The correlation coefficient between the residuals from
each ordered probit is ρdiv,earn. µC, µU , µMBS, µMS, and µMJ are the cutoff points estimated
by each model. λˆ divi,t and λˆ
earn
i,t are the generalized residuals formed from the dividend
choice and earnings choice models, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Dividend Choice Model Earnings Choice Model
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
Leverage -0.006*** Dispersion -0.040*** Leverage -0.005*** Dispersion -0.057***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Cash -0.008*** Analyst -0.083** Cash 0.002 Analyst 0.053*
(0.000) (0.020) (0.211) (0.055)
Net Income 0.027*** Dividend Prem 0.001 Net Income 0.003 Dividend Prem -0.003**
(0.000) (0.556) (0.679) (0.013)
Retained Earn -0.001 Default Prem -0.102*** Retained Earn 0.000 Default Prem -0.010
(0.343) (0.000) (0.914) (0.473)
Debt Change -0.000 Dividend Covt -0.000 Debt Change -0.001* Dividend Covt 0.000
(0.795) (0.569) (0.082) (0.537)
MTB -0.001 Non-invest -0.201*** MTB 0.003 Non-invest 0.040
(0.786) (0.000) (0.452) (0.308)
Return 0.002** Downgrade -0.109*** Return 0.004*** Downgrade -0.073**
(0.028) (0.003) (0.000) (0.031)
Size 0.084*** IC Neg -0.312*** Size -0.040** IC Neg -0.112
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.106)
IO Top 5% -0.009*** Underinvest -0.117*** IO Top 5% 0.001 Underinvest 0.044*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.394) (0.078)
Board Indep -0.000 Repurchase 0.142*** Board Indep 0.001 Repurchase 0.130***
(0.797) (0.000) (0.183) (0.000)
CEO Tenure 0.001 Dual Class 0.303*** CEO Tenure -0.008*** Dual Class 0.040
(0.830) (0.004) (0.000) (0.328)
Ownership -0.001 Fin Crisis -0.001 Ownership -0.007* Fin Crisis -0.096***
(0.836) (0.979) (0.082) (0.008)
Delta 0.000 Tax Year 0.171*** Delta -0.000 Tax Year -0.083***
(0.831) (0.000) (0.780) (0.008)
Vega -0.045** Last Divd Ann -0.894*** Vega 0.109*** Last Joint Ann 0.137***
(0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Last Earn Ann 0.477***
(0.000)
µˆu 0.264 λˆ divi,t - Average 0.000 µˆMBS 0.857 λˆ
earn
i,t - Average 0.000
µˆc -3.501 λˆ divi,t - Std. Dev 0.675 µˆMS -0.251 λˆ
earn
i,t - Std. Dev 0.903
µˆMJ -0.760
ρdiv,earn =0.057; p-value = 0.001***
Fiscal Quarter Dummies Yes Fiscal Quarter Dummies Yes
PseudoR2 10.90% Pseudo-R2 3.49%
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experience as managers reveal their private information to the market, the signs on these
coefficients imply that the release of an unexpected dividend increase represents a transfer
of wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Focusing on the results from model (2), the
estimated coefficient on λˆ divi,t is -9.35 for the bond market and 41.63 for the stock market.
This means that a one standard deviation increase above investors’ expectations (i.e. 0.675,
from Table 7) represents a loss of wealth to bondholders of approximately -6.31 bps and a
gain to shareholders’ wealth of 28.11 bps. In dollar terms, these figures would represent a
decrease in bondholders’ wealth of around $5.32 million and an increase in shareholders’
wealth of approximately $68.30 million. Thus, the results from the conditional event study
model seem to largely confirm with what was observed from the traditional event study ap-
proach; namely, that while surprise dividend increases do not represent pure wealth trans-
fers, a non-trivial portion of shareholders’ gains from these announcements are captured
from bondholders.
However, the conditional event study results also demonstrate that a positive signaling
effect is present in both markets. Specifically, consistent with theoretical signaling models
(e.g. Miller and Rock, 1985), both bondholders’ and shareholders’ abnormal returns are
increasing in the size of the announced dividend change. Again focusing on the results
from specification (2), the estimated coefficient on Dividend Chg is 0.28 for the bond mar-
ket and 0.82 for the stock market. Interpreting these coefficients suggests that a 100 basis
point increase in the dividend payout level increases bondholders’ wealth by 0.28 bps and
shareholders’ wealth by 0.82 bps. Thus, while it appears that unexpected positive dividend
announcements expropriate wealth away from bondholders toward shareholders, this effect
is partially mitigated by the signaling effect that is transmitted through the size of the an-
nounced dividend change. This finding stands in stark contrast to previous work done on
the changes to bondholders’ wealth due to alternative payout mechanisms. For example,
Maxwell and Stephens (2003) and Maxwell and Rao (2003) investigate how debtholders
respond to the announcement of share repurchases programs and corporate spin-offs, re-
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spectively. Similar dividends, each of these payout mechanisms is posited to potentially
have both wealth transfer and signaling effects. In both studies, the authors find that these
events represent wealth transfers on average and that bondholders’ losses are increasing in
the size of the transaction. Therefore, it appears that the credible commitment to maintain
a quarterly dividend payment allows it to act as signaling mechanism when compared to
other methods.
The results discussed above appear to be robust regardless of whether the presence of
confounding earnings announcements is controlled for via the dummy variable approach of
Dutordoir and Hodrick (2012) or the self-selection method adapted from Nayak and Prab-
hala (2001). The primary difference between the two methods seems to rest in their ability
to detect a statistically significant effect for unexpected positive earnings announcements in
the bond market, with the self-selection model doing a better job. Thus,the aforementioned
results do not appear to be driven by the presence of confounding earnings announcements.
Robustness Checks
To ensure the robustness of my results, I modify my approach along several different
dimensions to ascertain whether the results uncovered in specifications (1) and (2) still
present themselves. In models (3) and (4), I substitute a surprise dividend change term
for the actual announced dividend change. The reason for doing so is straightforward; its
seems naive to assume that investors can make assessments of firms’ dividend and earnings
announcement choices, but they are not similarly able to partially predict the magnitude of
announced dividend change. To create the surprise dividend change variable, I follow the
approach of Nayak and Prabhala (2001) and run the following regression:
DivChgi,t = pi0 +pi1wi,t−1 +pi2λˆ divi,t +u
surprise div
i,t (13)
where wi,t−1 are the vector of lagged variables used to predict the firm’s dividend
announcement choice, λˆ divi,t is the generalized residual from the dividend ordered probit
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Table 8: Cross-sectional Abnormal Return Regressions. Listed below are the
cross-sectional regressions for both the cumulative abnormal bond (CARbondi,t ) and stock
(CARstocki,t ) returns earned at dividend announcements. Both the cumulative abnormal bond
and stock returns are recorded over the [-2,+2] event window. Surprise Div is the unex-
pected portion of announced dividend change and Surprise Earn is the unexpected portion
of the SUE announced in quarter t. Both Surprise Div and Surprise Earn are computed via
the procedure established in Nayak and Prabhala (2001). All other variables are defined in
Appendix A. Standard errors are bootstrapped to account for generated regressors bias us-
ing 1,000 replications. P-values are recorded in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
(1.) (2.) (3.) (4.)
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
Regressors CARstocki,t CAR
bond
i,t Regressors CAR
stock
i,t CAR
bond
i,t Regressors CAR
stock
i,t CAR
bond
i,t Regressors CAR
stock
i,t CAR
bond
i,t
Div Chg 0.80*** 0.28*** Div Chg 0.82*** 0.28*** Surprise Div 0.79*** 0.27*** Surprise Div 0.79*** 0.27***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
λˆ divi,t 42.96*** -9.21*** λˆ
div
i,t 41.63*** -9.35*** λˆ
div
i,t 54.31*** -5.23* λˆ
div
i,t 53.34*** -5.23*
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.000) (0.070)
Meet-or-beat 72.53*** 2.27 λˆ earni,t 76.91*** 4.89** Meet-or-beat 72.57*** 2.28 λˆ
earn
i,t 76.90** 4.88**
(0.000) (0.597) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.596) (0.000) (0.028)
Missed -190.81*** -19.21*** Constant 0.31 -2.82 Missed -191.16*** -19.34*** Constant 3.24 -1.82
(0.000) (0.003) (0.907) (0.160) (0.000) (0.003) (0.518) (0.362)
Constant -3.98 -1.43*** Constant -1.12 -0.42
(0.567) (0.607) (0.872) (0.878)
Obs. 8,548 8,548 8,548 8,548 8,548 8,548 8,548 8,548
R2 0.027 0.002 0.032 0.003 0.034 0.003 0.039 0.003
(5.) (6.) (7.) (8.)
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
Regressors CARstocki,t CAR
bond
i,t Regressors CAR
stock
i,t CAR
bond
i,t Regressors CAR
bond
i,t Regressors CAR
bond
i,t
Div Chg 0.82*** 0.28*** Surprise Div 0.79*** 0.27*** CARstocki,t 0.03*** CAR
stock
i,t 0.03***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
SUE -0.04 -0.01 Surprise Earn -0.05 -0.02 Div Chg 0.26*** Div Chg 0.33***
(0.407) (0.657) (0.308) (0.251) (0.000) (0.000)
λˆ divi,t 41.25*** -9.43*** λˆ
div
i,t 52.96*** -5.47* λˆ
div
i,t -10.49*** CAR
stock
i,t x Div Chg -0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) (0.000) (0.141)
λˆ earni,t 77.95*** 4.95** λˆ
earn
i,t 77.00*** 4.76** λˆ
earn
i,t 2.78 λˆ
div
i,t -11.55***
(0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.032) (0.213) (0.000)
Constant 0.11 -2.71 Constant 2.84 -1.76 Constant -2.83 CARstocki,t x λˆ
div
i,t 0.02**
(0.982) (0.179) (0.572) (0.377) (0.158) (0.014)
λˆ earni,t 2.42
(0.281)
CARstocki,t x λˆ
earn
i,t -0.00
(0.315)
Constant -3.02
(0.136)
Obs. 8,548 8,548 8,548 8,548 8,548 8,548
R2 0.034 0.003 0.039 0.003 0.004 0.005
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model, and uunexp divi,t are the regression’s residuals which represent the unpredicted part of
the announced dividend change (i.e. Surprise Div). As can be seen in models (3) and
(4), the results to the inclusion of this variable are somewhat robust. While he statistical
significance of the estimated coefficient on λˆ divi,t in the bond equation remains, albeit at
the lower 10% level, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on λˆ divi,t is almost reduced
in half to -5.23 bps. Therefore, it appears that including a measure of dividend announce-
ment surprise which incorporates investors’ expectations regarding the anticipated dividend
announcement noticeably weakens, but does not completely eliminate, evidence of a sys-
tematic transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders.
In my second set of robustness checks, I include measures of SUE into the cross-
sectional regressions to ascertain whether the magnitude of the earnings surprise affects
my results. In model (5), I simply include SUE, as calculated in equation (12), as an
additional regressor and in model (6), I calculate the unpredicted amount of SUE in an
analogous manner to the surprise dividend change in equation (13) with the exception that
the right-hand side variables come from the earnings ordered probit regression. Overall,
the results are robust to this modification; neither measure of the magnitude of surprise
earnings is statistically significant. This suggest that λˆ earni,t captures all of the value relevant
information connected to the earnings announcement.22
The final set of reported robustness checks incorporate the cumulative abnormal stock
returns earned at the dividend announcements into the abnormal bond return regressions.
The purpose of this exercise is to determine how shareholders’ abnormal returns affect
the abnormal returns earned by bondholders. If shareholders gains are increasing in the
amount of wealth they expropriate from bondholders, then the estimated coefficient sign
for CARstocki,t will be negative; but, if shareholders’ and debtholders’ returns generally react
in a similar fashion to dividend news, the sign will be positive. The results of models (7) and
22In unreported work, I dropped λˆ earni,t from the equation and found that in this case the SUE variables
were statistically significant and positive. This supports the conclusion that λˆ earni,t is capturing this source of
earnings information.
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(8) seem to suggest that after controlling for the dividend surprise, both pairs of abnormal
returns are positively related to one another, consistent with the presence of signaling.
In addition to the robustness checks listed in Table 8, there are a number of unreported
robustness checks that I have estimated. These include: (i.) dropping the no change an-
nouncement firms from the regressions, (ii.) using clear returns versus dirty returns, (iii.)
partitioning the dividend and earnings announcement choices into finer bins (e.g. con-
sidering five bins for the dividend announcement type: large increase, small increase, no
change, small decrease, and large decrease),23 (iv.) testing for a nonlinear relationship be-
tween the magnitude of the announced dividend change and abnormal returns,24 and (v.)
testing cumulative abnormal bond and stock returns from different event windows. In all
cases the results were robust with the exception of the models estimated using cumulative
abnormal bond returns from the [-1,+1] event window. In general, the regressions estimated
using abnormal bond returns from the [-1,+1] event window failed to produce statistically
significant coefficients on the announced dividend change variable and λˆ divi,t .
25
23Overall, the results from this specification are nearly identical to the three-choice model. The reason the
three-choice model was employed throughout the paper is that it possessed a slightly higher pseudoR2 (i.e.
10.90%, from Table 7) than the five-choice alternative, whose psuedo-R2 was equal to 7.63%
24In fact, I do find some evidence of nonlinearities for both sets of investors. However, to a large extent
the nonlinearities tend to be concentrated in the extremes of the announced dividend changes. Thus, over the
vast majority of the data, the relationship between the announced dividend change and the abnormal returns
earned in each market appears to be fairly linear.
25It is not immediately clear why the estimated coefficients on these two variables were statistically in-
significant however one possible explanation may be that the relative illiquidity of the corporate debt market
prevents bond investors from trading immediately on their information which leads to longer event windows
having a greater potential to detect abnormal performance.
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CHAPTER V
PASSIVE EXPROPRIATION
In this chapter, I investigate the passive expropriation hypotheses of Allen and Michaely
(2003). In the first section, I provide an overview of the approach I will utilize to test for the
presence of passive expropriation. In the second section, I discuss my empirical findings.
Detecting Passive Expropriation
In their review of payout policy, Allen and Michaely (2003) briefly discuss the potential
agency issues that may arise between bondholders and shareholders due to dividend policy.
Allen and Michaely conclude that any attempt to expropriate wealth from bondholders in
the form of a large dividend payment would likely be detrimental to the firm in the long-run
due to the negative reputational costs (e.g. John and Nachman, 1985) it would impose upon
the firm if they return to the public debt market for financing in the future. Consequently,
they conclude that such blatant wealth grabs are unlikely to occur.
However, they propose a more subtle method through which dividend policy may trans-
fer wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Citing studies such as DeAngelo and DeAn-
gelo (1990), which find that managers are extremely hesitant to cut the firm’s dividends
even in periods of intense financial distress, Allen and Michaely suggest that managerial
inaction in cutting a unsustainable dividend level may shift wealth from debtholders to
shareholders. If investors are anticipating that the firm will cut its dividend, then the sur-
prise announcement that the dividend level will remain the same acts as an implicit dividend
increase. Hence, it is a “non-event” (i.e. the inability to reduce the dividend) that the market
is reacting to rather than an explicit action taken by management.
Prior work has documented evidence that managers will often take actions to maintain
dividend levels that may be harmful to bondholders. For instance, Brav et al. (2005) survey
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a number of Chief Financial Officers about their attitudes toward dividend policy and find
that managers are willing to take a number of drastic actions, such as selling assets, termi-
nating employees, taking on additional debt, and foregoing positive net present value in-
vestment projects, before contemplating cutting dividends. Daniel et al. (2010) investigate
the behavior of firms facing expected cash flow shortfalls and find that the overwhelming
majority of companies will cover the expected shortfall by either cutting back investment
or taking on additional debt. Alternative options such as cutting dividends, issuing equity,
selling assets, or drawing down cash balances do not appear to be widely implemented.
Given these results, the possibility that passive expropriation both exists and is detrimental
bondholders seems very real.
Testing for passive expropriation requires the ability to determine dividend announce-
ments where a dividend reduction is anticipated by capital market participants, but ulti-
mately managers decide to leave the existing payout level untouched. Fortunately, the
conditional event study approach discussed earlier is readily amenable to this task. As the
generalized residuals produced from the ordered probit model predicting the firm’s choice
of dividend announcement (i.e. λˆ divi,t ) measure the surprise caused by announcement, they
provide a natural means of testing the passive expropriation hypothesis. Specifically, by
focusing on the sample of dividend announcements that feature no change in the dividend
payout, it is possible to ascertain which firms announced an unexpected, implicit dividend
increase by investigating the sign of the generalized residual. If passive expropriation is
present in the data, it should be concentrated in firms that exceeded investors’ expectations
by announcing there would be no dividend change; in other words, to the extent that passive
expropriation exists, it should be most readily detectable in firms with positive generalized
residuals.
Therefore, I will take two different approaches for testing for passive expropriation.
The first method is to sort the abnormal bond and stock returns generated from dividend
announcements where no change in the dividend level is made into two groups; the first
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containing firms with positive generalized residuals and the second set comprised of all
other firms. While this dichotomous sorting is somewhat crude, it should serve to distin-
guish whether passive expropriation exists on net in the types of firms where it is most
likely to occur. In my second set of tests, I will estimate regressions that include the gen-
eralized residuals from both ordered probit models. These tests provide a more refined
approach as they control for both the magnitude of the dividend surprise as well as any
confounding effects emanating from nearby earnings announcements. In addition to these
tests, based on the results of Brav et al. (2005) and Daniel et al. (2010), I will also estimate
regressions which include variables measuring changes in debt and underinvestment to de-
termine if these factors exacerbate bondholders’ losses from passive expropriation. The
results of these tests are presented in the following section.
Passive Expropriation Results
Table 9 presents abnormal bond and stock returns sorted into categories based on the
sign of the predicted generalized residual, λˆ divi,t . Overall, the results appear to be some-
what consistent with the presence of passive expropriation. Across event windows, firms
classified into the negative generalized residual group tend to have economically small and
statistically insignificant cumulative abnormal bond and stock returns. This suggests that
both sets of investors in this group view no change dividend announcements as relatively
uninformative. The picture is markedly different for investors in firms with positive gener-
alized residuals. Starting at the [-2,+2] event window, the event study results clearly show
that bondholders do poorly at these events. At the [-2,+2] event window, debtholders lose
an average (median) of -7.36 bps (-4.95 bps). To place this finding in context, recall from
Table 3 that at the [-2,+2] event window an explicit dividend increase generates a mean
(median) loss of -7.52 bps (-3.21 bps). Thus, the implicit dividend increase caused by
managers’ inertia in reducing dividends is roughly equivalent in magnitude to an explic-
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itly announced dividend increase. Moreover, at the longer event windows, the mean and
median losses experienced by debtholders from implicit dividend increases are actually
slightly larger than their explicitly announced counterparts in Table 3.
Yet the degree to which shareholders gain from these implicit dividend increases is
unclear. For instance, while the average cumulative abnormal returns earned by sharehold-
ers at the [-2,+2] event window are 17.11 bps, the median abnormal returns are only 2.01
bps. In fact, the pattern of relatively large mean abnormal stock returns coupled with much
smaller median abnormal returns persists across all event windows. Given the stark differ-
ence between the mean and median abnormal stock returns, it appears that shareholders’
gains from implicit dividend increases are not widely experienced. Rather, taken together
with the results from the bond market, these findings suggest that while bondholders are
adversely affected by managers’ hesitancy in cutting dividends, the ability of shareholders
to gain from managers’ reluctance are largely concentrated in a subset of firms.
To help identify the circumstances in which bondholders’ losses and equityholders’
gains from passive expropriation increase, I estimate cross-sectional regressions of the ab-
normal stock and bond returns earned at no change dividend announcements against the
generalized dividend residual, λˆ divi,t . Besides allowing for greater variation in the amount
of surprise realized by bond and stock investors, the regression-based approach will allow
me to test whether issuing debt or cutting capital expenditures to maintain an established
dividend level expropriates wealth from bondholders while simultaneously controlling for
the presence of contemporaneous earnings information.
The cross-sectional regression results are presented in Table 10. In the first specifi-
cation, I simply include the generalized residuals from the dividend and earnings ordered
probit models as regressors. The results from this specification seems to largely concur with
the findings from Table 9; namely, that larger positive dividend surprises at announcements
of no dividend change are received negatively by debtholders, but do not affect sharehold-
ers’ wealth in a statistically significant fashion. In terms of economic significance, the
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Table 9: Passive Expropriation Event Study Results. The table below lists the results
from an event study which partitions abnormal bond and stock returns earned from dividend
announcements which feature no change in the dividend payout level into two groups. The
first set of firms are those with negative generalized residuals from the order probit model
(i.e. λˆ divi,t ≤ 0, firms that were either predicted to increase their dividend payout level, but
chose to leave it the same, or firms that were correctly predicted to leave their dividend
payment unmodified). The second group are firms with positive generalized residuals (i.e.
λˆ divi,t > 0, firms that were predicted to cut their dividend payment, but instead announced
that they were leaving it untouched). The average cumulative abnormal returns are stated
in basis points. Median cumulative abnormal returns for the event window are reported in
italics and are also stated in basis points. The p-values from two-sided t-tests, sign tests, and
sign-rank tests are reported below in parenthesis (), braces {}, and brackets [], respectively.
A dagger (i.e †) next to the p-value from either the sign or sign-rank test indicates that over
50% of the observations are negative in sign.
No Change Dividend Announcements with Negative Generalized Residuals - λˆ divi,t ≤ 0
Stock Abnormal Returns Bond Abnormal Returns
[-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-3,+3] [-4,+4] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-3,+3] [-4,+4]
3.10 0.69 1.01 2.81 -1.51 -1.67 -3.58 -5.56
0.96 -0.15 0.01 1.57 1.16 -0.88 -2.77 -0.15
(0.479) (0.899) (0.870) (0.683) (0.434) (0.461) (0.167) (0.052)
[0.872] [0.946]† [1.000] [0.819] [0.282] [0.476]† [0.129]† [0.925]†
{0.723} {0.681}† {0.986} {0.855} {0.754} {0.201}† {0.068}† {0.132}†
Obs. 5,533 5,536 5,540 5,546 5,533 5,536 5,540 5,546
No Change Dividend Announcements with Positive Generalized Residuals - λˆ divi,t > 0
Stock Abnormal Returns Bond Abnormal Returns
[-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-3,+3] [-4,+4] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-3,+3] [-4,+4]
14.31 17.11 26.27 38.25 -3.00 -7.36 -13.18 -16.05
0.32 2.01 6.80 4.26 -0.20 -4.95 -4.82 -9.78
(0.190) (0.193) (0.083) (0.033) (0.537) (0.160) (0.022) (0.019)
[0.958] [0.896] [0.677] [0.897] [0.835]† [0.081]† [0.019]† [0.002]†
{0.848} {0.511} {0.351} {0.205} {0.358}† {0.035}† {0.005}† {0.006}†
Obs. 1,473 1,474 1,477 1,482 1,473 1,474 1,477 1,482
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estimated coefficient on λˆ divi,t (i.e. - 20.71) in the abnormal bond return equation implies
that a one standard deviation announcement surprise (i.e. 0.675, from Table 7) would cor-
respond to a -13.71 bps decrease in wealth, or an approximately $6.89 million drop in
the average market value of debt. This finding once again highlights the seriousness that
implicit dividend increases can have on bondholder wealth.
In the second and third specifications, I augment the framework in the first model to in-
clude variables measuring the lagged percentage increase in total debt (i.e. long-term plus
short-term debt) and lagged underinvestment as Brav et al. (2005) and Daniel et al. (2010)
have identified them as avenues through which passive expropriation may occur. The re-
sults from the second specification investigating debt issuance show strong evidence that
the use of debt to preserve a pre-established dividend level transfers wealth from bondhold-
ers to shareholders. Specifically, the estimated coefficient on the debt change variable is
positive for the stock equation and negative for the bond equation. This implies that equity-
holders’ wealth is increasing, and debtholders’ wealth is decreasing, in the amount of debt
issued to maintain the existing dividend level. Additionally, as the estimated coefficient on
the interaction term between the percentage change in total debt and λˆ divi,t is positive for the
stock market and negative for the bond market, this suggests that the wealth transfer effect
is amplified by the magnitude of the announcement surprise.26
The results for the underinvestment specification (column 3) demonstrate that maintain-
ing a dividend through investment cuts tend to decrease both bondholder and shareholder
wealth, although the results are only statistically significant for the abnormal stock return
equation. The findings of the fourth specification, which simply combines specifications
two and three, largely confirm the previous results. Namely, the use of additional debt to
finance an otherwise unsustainable dividend payment benefits shareholders at debtholders’
26One possible concern is that the absolute value of the estimated coefficients on λˆ divi,t x Debt Change should
be approximately the same size if the the use of debt to maintain the dividend levels truly acts as expropriation.
However, leverage increasing events are likely to benefits shareholders in other ways (e.g. increasing the size
of the interest expense tax shield, discipling managers, etc.), thus it is not necessarily the case that the two
coefficients should be approximately equal.
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Table 10: Passive Expropriation Regression Results. Listed below are the cross-sectional regressions for both the cumulative ab-
normal bond (CARbondi,t ) and stock (CAR
stock
i,t ) returns earned at dividend announcements. Both the cumulative abnormal bond and stock
returns are recorded over the [-2,+2] event window. Standard errors are bootstrapped to account for generated regressors bias using 1,000
replications. P-values are recorded in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Dependent Variables
(1.) (2.) (3.) (4.)
Regressors CARstocki,t CARbondi,t CARstocki,t CARbondi,t CARstocki,t CARbondi,t CARstocki,t CARbondi,t
λˆ divi,t -8.55 -20.71* -19.35 -21.50* 74.25* -9.13 59.77 -3.65
(0.752) (0.079) (0.477) (0.066) (0.062) (0.593) (0.136) (0.832)
λˆ earni,t 79.25*** 5.49** 79.07*** 5.52** 88.36*** 8.73** 88.36*** 8.83**
(0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.018)
Debt Change 1.13*** -0.37*** 1.11*** -0.37***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
Underinvest -31.98* -5.09 -29.08* -6.09
(0.069) (0.500) (0.099) (0.420)
λˆ divi,t x Debt Change 2.71*** -0.97** 2.55*** -1.00**
(0.006) (0.022) (0.009) (0.017)
λˆ earni,t x Debt Change 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.02
(0.800) (0.812) (0.835) (0.780)
λˆ divi,t x Underinvest -158.21*** -31.27 -150.81*** -34.24
(0.004) (0.180) (0.006) (0.142)
λˆ earni,t x Underinvest -16.81 -6.06 -17.05 -6.04
(0.150) (0.226) (0.144) (0.228)
Constant -5.12 -11.02*** -9.59 -8.32** 12.29 -7.09 6.22 -5.05
(0.555) (0.004) (0.273) (0.027) (0.359) (0.217) (0.644) (0.382)
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expense while underinvestment leads to statistically significant lower returns for sharehold-
ers, but not debtholders.
Overall, the results of Table 9 provide some evidence of the existence of the passive
expropriation hypothesis of Allen and Michaely (2003). They demonstrated that bond-
holders are clearly harmed from the “announcement” of an implicit dividend increase, but
provided mixed evidence as to whether shareholders systematically gained from managers’
reluctance to cut dividends. However, the results of Table 10 provided some additional
context by finding that the use of additional debt to maintain firms’ established dividend
policies tends to exacerbates the passive wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders.
These findings are important as they uncover a subtle method through which wealth ex-
propriation can occur and they emphasize the importance of using conditional event study
techniques in determining how “non-events” can affect investors’ wealth.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive account of how dividend an-
nouncements affect bondholders’ wealth. While the question has been addressed by pre-
vious work, a number of systematic changes related to how payout policy is conducted
and firms are governed have occurred since their publication, prompting the need for a
reinvestigation.
I utilized two different methods for investigating the research question at hand. The first
was a traditional event study approach using the updated bond event study methodology
developed by Bessembinder et al. (2009). In contrast to the the results from Handjinicolaou
and Kalay (1984), these findings from my tests showed that dividend increases represent
a transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders, on average, with approximately
3.54% of shareholders’ total dollar gains over the [-2,+2] event window coming via transfer
of wealth from debtholders.27 Further contrary to results of Handjinicolaou and Kalay
(1984), I find no evidence that dividend cuts are interpreted by bond and stock investors as
negative signals, although the correlation between abnormal bond and stock returns earned
at dividend omissions provides some cursory support for this conclusion.
The second approach used was a conditional event study based on the framework es-
tablished by Nayak and Prabhala (2001). The purpose of the conditional event study was
help control for the non-random selection of a particular dividend announcement choice
(i.e either increasing, decreasing, or leaving the dividend unchanged) by managers and
to control for the pervasive presence of quarterly earnings releases made near dividend
announcements. The findings from the conditional event study buttresses those from the
traditional event study. Specifically, unexpected dividend increase are viewed positively by
27Bondholders lose about $4.32 million and shareholders gain $122.16 million on average over the [-2,+2]
event window during a dividend increase ($4.32/$122.16 = 3.54%).
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the stock market, but negatively by debtholders, ultimately resulting in a transfer of wealth
between the two parties. Yet, the conditional event study also demonstrates that both bond-
holders’ and equityholders’ abnormal returns are increasing in the size of the announced
dividend change. This finding is consistent with the presence of a positive signaling ef-
fect. Taken in whole, these results imply that while surprise dividend increases lead to a
decrease in debtholders’ wealth, the decline in value is dampened by the positive signaling
effect. Additionally, it was demonstrated that the aforementioned results are not driven by
the presence of confounding earnings announcements.
The use of the conditional event study methodology provides the added benefit of be-
ing able to test for the presence of passive expropriation. Originally proposed by Allen
and Michaely (2003), the passive expropriation hypothesis posits that managerial inaction
in reducing a unsustainable dividend may cause a transfer of wealth from bondholders to
shareholders. Intuitively, if investors’ believe that the firm will cut its dividend, the unex-
pected announcement that the dividend will remain unchanged acts as an implicit dividend
increase. Investigation of a sample of firms that announced no change in their dividend
payout level provided some evidence of passive expropriation. The results found that while
bondholders plainly lose when managers fail to make expected dividend cuts, the extent
to which shareholders gain is unclear. Additional testing based on the work of Brav et al.
(2005) and Daniel et al. (2010) found that the issuance of additional debt financing to main-
tain the established dividend amount was one avenue through which passive expropriation
occurs.
Overall, this study helps to fill a deficit in the corporate governance literature pertain-
ing to our knowledge about how payout policy can cause conflicts between creditors and
owners. It is my hope that this study will help to spur further work along these lines; for
example, investigating the wealth effects experienced by bondholders following the rash of
special dividend payments made before the expiration of the 2003 dividend tax cuts at the
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end of 2012 or examining how the increased use of dividend recapitalizations by private
equity firms affects their bondholders’ wealth.
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APPENDIX A
SIZE TESTS
As extensive data on daily corporate bond prices has only recent become available
with the implementation of the TRACE database in 2002, there is still a great amount of
heterogeneity across studies with regards to the appropriate benchmarking method needed
to calculate well-behaved abnormal bond returns. Consequently, different benchmarking
schemes may yield abnormal bond returns with very different characteristics. Therefore,
the purpose of this appendix is to provide some guidance on the statistical properties of my
firm-level cumulative abnormal bond returns.
In Panel A of Table 11, I display summary statistics for the firm-level abnormal bond
returns formed using the procedure outlined in Chapter 2. The most noteworthy points to
emerge from Panel A is that the firm-level abnormal returns appear to have a negative tilt.
While abnormal returns do not seem to exhibit a sizable amount of negative skew (the skew-
ness measure is only -0.07), the fact that both the mean and median cumulative abnormal
firm-level returns are negative and the percentage of positive cumulative abnormal returns
is slightly below 50.00% does suggest that the abnormal bonds returns used throughout the
study are biased downward.
To ascertain how the negative bias affects the ability of my statistical tests (i.e. student’s
t-test, sign test, and sign-rank test) to detect abnormal performance when none is present,
in Panel B, I present the results of a Monte Carlo simulation which randomly selects 200
firms and calculates their cumulative abnormal returns over two different event windows, [-
1,+1] and [-4,+4] and the repeats this exercise 1,000 times. I partition the failure to accept
the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance into two groups depending on whether
the failure occurred in the lower (2.50%) or upper tail (97.50%) of the distribution. If the
test statistics are well-behaved at the 5.00% level of statistical significance then the rate of
failure should be around 2.50% in each tail.
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Table 11: Summary Statistics and Size Properties for Cumulative Abnormal Bond
Returns. Panel A displays the statistical properties of the firm-level cumulative abnormal
returns calculated from the [-1,+1] event window. The mean, median, and standard devi-
ation are reported in basis points. Panel B shows the percentage of times the respective
tests incorrectly rejects the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance at the 5.00% level
for cumulative abnormal returns calculated at the [-1,+1] and [-4,+4] event windows. The
results come from a Monte Carlo simulation where the cumulative abnormal returns from
200 randomly selected firms are collected and the procedure is repeated 1,000 times. The
inability to correctly fail to reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance is broken
into two different types of failures: (i.) those events that found false evidence of negative
abnormal performance (i.e. the 2.50% tail) and (ii.) those that incorrectly found positive
abnormal performance (i.e. the 97.50% tail).
Panel A. Return Properties
Mean -1.11 Skewness -0.07
Median -1.02 Excess Kurtosis 0.17
Standard Deviation 13.04 % Positive 47.84%
Panel B. Size Tests
T-test Sign test Sign-rank test
Event Window 2.50% 97.50% 2.50% 97.50% 2.50% 97.50%
[-1,+1] 2.80% 2.21% 3.22% 4.41% 2.11% 1.73%
[-4,+4] 3.41% 0.90% 4.74% 3.81% 2.83% 1.44%
Despite the negative tilt, the results from Panel B shows that the t-test and sign-rank
tests now appear to be fairly well-specified at the [-1,+1] interval. The false acceptance
rate for my abnormal bond returns are 2.80% and 2.21% for the t-test and 2.11% and
1.73% of the sign-rank test, respectively. For the sake of comparison, Bessembinder et al.
(2009) find that the false acceptance rate are 2.30% and 2.18% for the t-test and 2.54%
and 1.50% for the sign-rank test for the lower and upper tails, respectively.28 Thus, my
abnormal bond returns tend to show a slightly greater tendency to detect negative abnormal
performance where none is present using t-test compared to Bessembinder et al. (2009) at
the [-1,+1] event window. However, my results for the sign test appear to underreject the
null hypothesis far too often in both directions. In particular, the false acceptance rates I
find are 3.22% in the lower tail and 4.41% in the upper tail. Both of these values are higher
28The results from Bessembinder et al. (2009) come from their Table 8 for the investment-grade bond
sample (which comprise around 80% of my observations) with returns calculated on a trade-weighted basis
featuring trades over $100,000 in size.
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than the 2.68% and 2.30% reported by Bessembinder et al. (2009). Therefore, it appears
that my procedure for calculating abnormal returns leads to very poorly specified sign tests.
The results for the [-4,+4] event window demonstrate an increased propensity to in-
correctly detect negative abnormal performance across each of the statistical tests. For
example, the false rejection for the t-test in the lower tail is 3.41% and 4.74% for the sign
test. Thus, there is a greater likelihood of finding negative abnormal performance where
none actually exists using the t-test and sign test over longer event windows. However,
in contrast, the sign-rank test still appears to be relatively well-specified during the longer
event window. Thus, taken together, the results from Table 11 seem to indicate that there
is a slight negative bias to my abnormal bond returns and that this negative bias affects
the ability to correctly detect non-abnormal performance especially during longer event
windows.
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APPENDIX B
DIVIDEND INITIATIONS AND OMISSIONS
Rather than representing a modification of the firm’s existing dividend policy (whether
to maintain or modify the firm’s existing dividend payout level), which is the primary focus
of this study, the decision to either initiate or omit a dividend payment embodies a funda-
mental shift in the firm’s payout policy (the decision of whether the firm should payout at
all). Consequently, I have excluded dividend initiations and omissions from my primary
tests. Moreover, given that the movement along this margin tends to be fairly limited and
the choice modeling framework is already crowded by three different managerial decisions,
it is not obvious that the additional cost in terms of econometric complexity is worth what-
ever information could be gained. Nevertheless, as these events represent significant shifts
in payout policy regarding dividends, they provide an unique setting for determining how
investors in leveraged firms view the payment of dividends in general.
My sample of dividend initiators comes from the CRSP events file. To be considered
an initiator, a firm must be establishing a quarterly dividend payment for the first time
and cannot have paid a dividend at any time in the past. CRSP does not include dividend
omissions in its events file, therefore to generate the sample of dividend omitters, I searched
LexisNexis for news stories involving the firms in my sample that appear to suddenly stop
paying dividends.29 Consistent with the infrequency of these events, after applying the data
filters discussed in Chapter 2., my final sample only includes around 39 initiations and 28
omissions.
The event study results for both sets of firms are presented in Table 12. One fact that
becomes immediately obvious is that while the average abnormal bond and stock returns
are often large in magnitude, they are also generally statistically insignificant. This is
29Search terms included the firm name and phrases such as “quit dividend”, “dividend ended”, “dividend
suspended”, and “dividend omitted”.
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Table 12: Dividend Initiations and Omissions. Average cumulative abnormal returns
are stated in basis points. Median cumulative abnormal returns for the event window are
reported in italics and are also stated in basis points. The p-values from two-sided t-tests,
sign tests, and sign-rank tests are reported below in parenthesis (), braces {}, and brackets
[], respectively. A dagger (i.e †) next to the p-value from either the sign or sign-rank test
indicates that over 50% of the observations are negative in sign. Panels C and D report
the Spearman correlation coefficient (i.e. ρ) between the cumulative abnormal bond and
stock returns in the given event window. The p-values for Spearman’s ρ are listed below in
parentheses.
Panel A. Abnormal Stock Returns Panel B. Abnormal Bond Returns
Event Window Event Window
[-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-3,+3] [-4,+4] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-3,+3] [-4,+4]
Initiations 141.08 180.46 147.66 140.32 11.44 -1.58 -10.88 -17.34
84.72 189.83 211.22 159.48 9.32 0.90 -22.18 -38.29
(0.065) (0.030) (0.092) (0.101) (0.528) (0.949) (0.645) (0.479)
{0.256} {0.053} {0.108} {0.336} {0.256} {0.871} {0.337}† {0.053}†
[0.078] [0.033] [0.106] [0.159] [0.321] [0.883] [0.258]† [0.185]†
Obs. 38 39 39 39 38 39 39 39
Omissions -163.59 -333.92 -741.66 -776.47 -23.69 -170.92 -179.58 -76.38
-109.11 -307.92 -977.41 -683.96 -33.61 -58.38 -6.00 -76.38
(0.667) (0.456) (0.203) (0.133) (0.831) (0.112) (0.129) (0.589)
{0.851} {0.185}† {0.085}† {0.087}† {0.701}† {0.122}† {0.701}† {0.442}†
[0.909] [0.426]† [0.106]† [0.062]† [0.561]† [0.148]† [0.356]† [0.368]†
Obs. 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Panel C. Spearman Correlation - Initiations Panel D. Spearman Correlation - Omissions
Spearman’s ρ 0.298 0.102 -0.064 0.086 0.504 0.533 0.336 0.199
(p-value) (0.069) (0.535) (0.698) (0.601) (0.006) (0.004) (0.081) (0.309)
primarily due to the paucity of observations. Given the relatively small sample sizes, it is
perhaps best to view the results of Table 12 qualitatively rather than quantitatively.
The dividend initiation sample shows some evidence of dividends being interpreted as
positive signals in the [-1,+1] event window. During this event period, shareholders gain
around 141.08 (84.72) bps on average (median) while debtholders earn 11.44 (9.32) bps.
As I do not include these events into my cross-sectional regressions, I list the Spearman
correlation coefficient between both sets of abnormal returns to ascertain whether they
generally move in the same direction (consistent with signaling) or whether they move in
opposite directions (consistent with expropriation). At the [-1,+1] event window, the cor-
relation between the abnormal bond and stock returns earned at the initiation of a dividend
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is 0.298 and statistically significant at the 10% level. This indicates that both groups of
investors view the establishment of a dividend payment as a positive signal. However, the
evidence for signaling weakens as the length of the event window increases. At the longer
windows, the average and median abnormal bond returns turn negative and the correlation
coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. Thus, while there is some cursory evidence
of dividend initiations being positive signals for both debtholders and equityholders, it can-
not be considered consistent.
The dividend omission sample demonstrates a more persistent pattern of abnormal re-
turns relative to the initiation sample. Across all event windows, both the abnormal bond
and stock returns are reliably negative and large in magnitude, albeit statistically insignif-
icant. Additionally, the Spearman’s correlation coefficient is positive across all event win-
dows and is statistically significant at the 10% level in three of the four cases. The positive
correlation between the abnormal returns suggests that both groups of investors view divi-
dend omissions as negative signals of firm value. Taken together, the results from dividend
initiation and omission samples seem to provide some evidence of omissions as acting as
negative signals while the results from initiations are generally inconclusive.
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APPENDIX C
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
This appendix outlines the construction of the variables used throughout this study. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percentiles unless otherwise stated.
Financial Variables
• Leverage is defined to be the ratio of total financial debt held by firm i in quarter
t-1 divided by the firm’s financial debt plus its market value of equity in quarter t-1
multiplied by 100. Data are from Compustat.
• Cash is the lagged ratio of the firm’s cash holdings to its total assets multiplied by
100. Data are from Compustat.
• Net Income is the lagged ratio of firm i’s net income divided by its total assets multi-
plied by 100. Data are from Compustat.
• Ret Earn is the lagged proportion of the firm’s retained earnings to its total assets
multiplied by 100. Data are from Compustat.
• Debt Change is the lagged percentage change in the firm’s total financial debt (i.e.
short-term plus long-term) multiplied by 100. Data are from Compustat.
• MTB is firm i’s market-to-book ratio from quarter t-1. It is defined as the ratio of firm
i’s lagged market value of equity from quarter t-1 divided by the firm’s book value of
assets. Data are from Compustat.
• Non-Invest is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has non-investment grade
debt and zero otherwise. Data are from Mergent FISD.
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• Downgrade is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has had its debt downgraded
in the past year. Data are from Mergent FISD.
• IC Neg is dummy variable equal to one if firm i’s interest coverage ratio (defined as
the ratio of firm i’s earnings before interest and taxes to its interest expense) is less
than zero. Data are from Compustat.
• Underinvest is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm invested less than the median
firm in its two-digit SIC code industry in quarter t-1. Data are from Compustat.
• Repurchase is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was a net stock repurchaser
(i.e. the amount of stock purchased surpasses the amount of stock issued) in quarter
t-1. Data are from Compustat.
• Return is the percentage return of the firm’s stock from quarter t-2 to t-1. Data are
from CRSP and are unwinsorized.
• Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s lagged market value of equity. Data are
from CRSP and are unwinsorized.
Governance Variables
• IO Top 5% is the lagged proportion of the firm’s outstanding shares owned by its five
largest institutional shareholders. Institutional Ownership data are from Thomson-
Reuters and shares outstanding data are from CRSP.
• Board Indep is the lagged proportion of board seats held by independent directors on
the firm’s board of directors. Data are from RiskMetrics and are unwinsorized.
• CEO Tenure is equal to the number of years, as of quarter t-1, the current CEO has
been at their current position. Data are from Execucomp and are unwinsorized.
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• Dividend Covt is the proportion of firm i’s debt issues with a restrictive dividend
covenant in place. Data are from Mergent FISD.
Managerial Compensation Variables
• Ownership is defined as the percentage of the firm’s outstanding equity is owned by
its top management. Ownership data are from Execucomp and shares outstanding
data are from CRSP.
• Delta is the dollar change in managers’ wealth given a one percent change in stock
price; it is measured in thousands of dollars. Data used to calculate the delta measure
are from Execucomp. Delta is calculated in the manner developed in Core and Guay
(2002) and refined by Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006).
• Vega is the dollar change in managers’ wealth increases given a one percent change
in the standard deviation of stock returns; it is measured in thousands of dollars.
Data used to calculate the delta measure are from Execucomp. Vega is calculated in
the manner developed in Core and Guay (2002) and refined by Coles, Daniel, and
Naveen (2006).30
Signaling Variables
• Dispersion is the difference between the the highest and lowest analyst estimates of
earnings per share divided by the absolute value of the median analyst forecast from
quarter t -1. Data are from IBES.
30 I kindly thank Jeffrey Coles, Naveen Daniel, and Lalitha Naveen for making their code to calculate
Delta and Vega publicly available.
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• Analyst is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following
the firm in quarter t-1. Data are from IBES.
• Dual Class is a binary variable equal to one if the firm has more than one class of
share that publicly trades. Data are from CRSP.
Other Variables
• Financial Crisis is a dummy variable equal to one if the dividend annoucement took
place during the recent subprime mortgage crisis. Following Duchin et al. (2010), I
define the crisis period as having occurred from July 2007 to March 2009.
• Dividend Prem is the lagged dividend premium from Baker and Wurgler (2004). The
dividend premium is defined as the difference between the natural logarithm of the
average value-weighted market-to-book ratio for dividend payers and non-payers.
• Default Prem is the lagged spread between the yields on AAA-rated corporate debt
versus ten-year Treasury bonds. Data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis’s FRED database.
• Tax Year is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is either 2010 or 2012.
• Last Divd Act is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm announced a dividend
increase in the last quarter and zero otherwise.
• Last Joint Ann is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm announced
earnings information within the [-7,+7] dividend event window last quarter and zero
otherwise.
• Last Earn Ann is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm announced earnings that
meet-or-beat analysts’ expectations last quarter.
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• Meet-or-beat is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i announced a meet-or-beat
earnings announcement during the [-7,+7] dividend event window and zero other-
wise. A firm is considered to have meet-or-beat analysts’ expectations if its surprise
unexpected earnings (SUE, defined in equation 12) are non-negative (i.e. SUE ≥ 0).
• Missed is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i announced quarterly earnings
that missed analysts’ forecast during the [-7,+7] dividend event window and zero
otherwise. A firm is considered to have missed analysts’ expectations if its surprise
unexpected earnings (SUE, defined in equation 12) are strictly negative (i.e. SUE <
0).
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